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SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BERNARD L. SHIENTAGt
T HE charge is frequently made that the reformer is impractical.
That charge can hardly be said to attach to those who took the lead
in the adoption and extension of the rules providing for summary judg-
ment in this state. It is the consensus, that the remedy of summary
judgment has demonstrated its worth as a prompt, business-like and in-
expensive method of disposing of a substantial amount of litigation.
There is no more effective weapon in the arsenal of legal administration.
For a sitting judge to write on the law of summary judgment, is some-
what in the nature of a hazardous undertaking. The writer knows
however, that he can rely on the generosity of the bar to overlook
errors that are bound to creep into any extra-judicial discussion. Indeed,
some find their way into formal judicial pronouncements. That must be
so, in the very nature of things. The day that any judicial officer feels
an incapacity on his part to make a mistake, marks the end of his use-
fulness on the bench. We are beginning to appreciate the significance of
what Charles James Fox termed, "the glorious uncertainty which always
attends the law."
The story, now a commonplace, is told of Lamb's reply to Coleridge's
question, "Charles, did you ever hear me preach?"-"I never heard
you do anything else." Mindful of the implications of this story, the
writer feels nevertheless, that a judge's viewpoint, particularly on matters
of practice and procedure, expressed more freely and adequately than
through the circumscribed medium of judicial opinions, may be of service
to his brethren at the bar. It is a good thing now and then to descend
from airy judicial stilts, and thrust aside "the high, mysterious brow"
which judicial learning is apt to wear, especially as reflected in the
Official Reports.
The story is told of Baron Parke, that on one occasion a legal friend
of his was ill and Parke went to his bedside, taking with him a special
demurrer, which had been submitted to him. "It was so exquisitely
drawn," he said, "that he felt sure that it must cheer the patient to read
it." Legend has it that once "he was summoned to advise the Lords,
and in the midst of the argument was suddenly seized with a fainting
fit. Cold water, hartshorn and other restoratives were applied without
effect. At length an idea occurred to one of his brethren who well knew
his peculiar temperament and he immediately acted on it. He rushed
into the library, seized a large musty volume of the old statutes, came
t Justice, Supreme Court of New York. The material in this article, revised for publica-
tion, was originally intended to be used as the basis of a lecture to members of the New
York County Lawyers Association, on March 21, 1935, which, because of illness had to be
cancelled.
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back and applied it to the nostrils of the patient. The effect was
marvelous. He at once opened his eyes, gave them a slight rub, and in
a few seconds he was well as ever."' To expect an article on summary
judgment to have any such extraordinary and unnatural effect, would
be futile.
The History of the Summary Judgment Rule
The history of the remedy of summary judgment in this country and
in Europe has been fully covered elsewhere. The rule, as now in force
in this state, originated in England in 1855 and was amplified there in
1873. In 1912, it was adopted in New Jersey. Since 1885, when, in a
limited form it was recommended by David Dudley Field, there had
been a sporadic agitation for its adoption in this state. Finally, on the
recommendation of the Convention to Formulate Rules of Civil Practice,
Rule 113, providing for summary judgment, was adopted, and went into
effect October 1, 1921.
The end sought to be accomplished by this rule, was to do away with
the delay and expense entailed upon the enforcement of a legal claim,
where denials were interposed which, although sufficient on their face,
were actually sham and feigned and in reality raised no genuine, triable
issue of fact.
The rule as first adopted, was narrow in scope. It read as follows:
"Rule 113. SUMMARY JUDGMENT. When an answer is served in an
action to recover a debt or liquidated demand arising
1. on a contract, express or implied, sealed or not sealed; or
2. on a judgment for a stated sum;
the answer may be struck out and judgment entered thereon on motion, and
the affidavit of the plaintiff or of any other person having knowledge of the
facts, verifying the cause of action and stating the amount claimed, and his
belief that there is no defense to the action; unless the defendant by affidavit,
or other proof, shall show such facts as may be deemed, by the judge hearing
the motion, sufficient to entitle him to defend."
It remained without change until 1932 when, under the leadership of
Judge Edward R. Finch, then Presiding Justice of the Appellate
Division, First Department, its scope was extended to include many
additional types of actions. By that amendment, summary judgment
was allowed in an action (1) to recover a debt or liquidated demand
arising on a contract, express or implied, in fact or in law, sealed or
not sealed; (2) to recover a debt or liquidated demand arising on a
1. M soz, THE Buiwus oF OuR Lsw 34.
2. See the authorities collected in Cohen, Summary Judgments in the Supreme Court
of New York (1932) 32 COL. L. RLv. 825, 830; Clark & Samenow, The Summary Judg-
ment (1929) 3S YA . L. J. 423.
3. For the history of this movement see Saxe, Summary Judgments in New York (1934)
19 Come. L. Q. 237.
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judgment for a stated sum; (3) on a statute where the sum sought to be
recovered is a sum of money other than a penalty; (4) to recover an
unliquidated debt or demand for a sum of money only, arising on a
contract express or implied in fact, or in law, sealed or not sealed, other
than for breach of promise to marry; (5) to recover possession of a
specific chattel or chattels with or without a claim for the hire thereof
or for damages for the taking or detention thereof; (6) to enforce a lien
or mortgage; (7) for specific performance of a contract in writing for
the sale or purchase of property, including such alternative and incidental
relief as the case may require; (8) for an accounting arising on a written
contract, sealed or not sealed.
With respect to subdivisions 3, 4 and 5, if no issue of fact were raised
other than the amount due, the court was authorized to order an assess-
ment, to determine the amount due, before a referee, by the court alone,
or by the court and jury, whichever should be appropriate.4 With
respect to subdivisions 6, 7 and 8, the court was authorized, if there
were no issue of fact, to render an interlocutory judgment, and thence-
forth the action was permitted to proceed in the ordinary course.
It is significant, that in the decade which elapsed between the adoption
of the rule and its first amendment, both bench and bar came to look
upon the summary remedy as an integral part of the law. While the
original enactment was fought by many who saw in it an encroachment
upon the ancient right of trial by jury, the amendment encountered
practically no opposition.
Under the first amendment, the defendant was still left without re-
course to a summary remedy, even though he could show that plaintiff's
cause of action, while good on its face, did not in reality present a
triable issue. Rule 113 was further amended in 1933, so that the de-
fendant was permitted to take advantage of the summary procedure, on
the basis of a defense as well as a counter-claim. As the rule now stands,
a defendant is permitted to move for summary judgment in all cases in
which the plaintiff could apply for relief. In that event, the plaintiff is
required to show by affidavit or other proof, that his complaint presents
a triable issue of fact, in the same manner that the defendant is required
to do, if the genuineness of his answer is attacked.
4. For an analysis of the amended rule, the following articles by Judge Edward R.
Finch are extremely valuable: 4 Nzv YoRx STATn BAR AssociArlox BULLxTm 264; MAss.
L. Q. February 1933, p. 15; 19 A. B. A. J. 504; 17 JOURNAL AmERICAN JUDICATURr SocIr
180. The explanation for the redundancy found in the amended rule, appears in the article
in the Massachusetts Law Quarterly. An interesting question has arisen under Subdivision
2 of the amended rule in connection with the right to summary judgment on a foreign
judgment where the amount thereof is in terms of foreign currency. The court at Special
Term ordered a reference to fix the amount due in American dollars. Delaney v. Stras-
burger, N. Yr L. J., Aug. 2, 1934, at 315. An appeal is now pending in the Appellate
Division,. First Department.
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In addition, a defendant may proceed under the amended rule in any
action, even if not included within the classes enumerated in subdivisions
1-8, if his defense, sufficient as a matter of law, is founded upon facts
established prima facie by documentary evidence or official record.
In such case the plaintiff, to defeat the motion, is required to show facts
tcsufficient to raise an issue with respect to the verity and conclusiveness
of such documentary evidence or official record."' While the defendant
waited long for relief, when finally it came, he was given a wider latitude
in moving for summary judgment than the plaintiff.
The present rule applies to contracts implied in law as well as in fact.o
The old cases holding that the damages must be liquidated and certain,
are no longer law. As Judge Finch has pointed out, at common law the
assessment of damages, whether liquidated or unliquidated, was never
referable as of right to a jury.7 Now, if a case comes under the rule,
and the only question is the amount of damages, the motion is granted
and an assessment ordered.8 "The defendant, of course, will be entitled
to notice of the assessment of plaintiff's damages and may appear and
cross-examine plaintiff's witnesses and offer testimony upon the question
of damages solely."'
If no triable issue is raised in an action to foreclose a mortgage, the
exact amount due may be determined before a referee appointed to
compute."0 In many cases the court makes the computation, so that a
reference becomes unnecessary, and final judgment of foreclosure and
sale can be entered without delay. An action for replevin comes under
the amended rule." An action for conversion does not." If the tort is
waived and the complaint proceeds on implied contract, the rule may
S. See Rule 113, Rules Civil Practice (1921) as amended in 1933. See alko Finch,
Summary Judgment Procedure (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 504, 50.
6. Lee v. Graubard, 205 App. Div. 344, 199 N. Y. Supp. 563 (1st Dep't 1923), overruling,
Poland Export Corp. v. Marcus, 204 App. Div. 302, 198 N. Y. Supp. 5 (lst Dep't 1923).
7. See Finch, supra note 5, at 507, and cases there cited. See also McClelland v. Climax
Hosiery Mills, 252 N. Y. 347, 169 N. E. 605 (1930).
S. International and Industrial Securities Corp. v. Jamaica Jewich Center, 237 App.
Div. 738, 263 N. Y. Supp. 840 (1933); Fuller v. American Surety Co, 153 Misc. 432, 275
N. Y. Supp. 113 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1934).
9. See Gise v. Brooldyn Society, 236 App. Div. 852, 260 N. Y. Supp. 787, 789 (2d Dep't
1932); Aiken Mills v. Boss Mfg. Co., 238 App. Div. 605, 265 N. Y. Supp. 55S (let Dep't
1933).
10. Pellino v. 3232 Hull Ave. Realty Corp., 237 App. Div. 759, 264 N. Y. Supp. 214
(1st Dep't 1933).
11. Rule 113, subd. 5, Rules Civil Practice (1921); Lightolier Co. v. Del Miar Club
Holding Co., Inc., 237 App. Div. 432, 262 N. Y. Supp. 32 (1st Dep't 1933), Af'd, 263 N.
Y. 588, 189 N. E. 711 (1933).
12. Formel v. National City Bank, 152 Misc. 275, 273 N. Y. Supp. 817 (App. Term
1st Dep't 1934); Gilbert v. Gotham Credit Corp., 152 Misc. 598, 273 N. Y. Supp. 815 (App.
Term 1st Dep't 1934).
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be invoked.1 3 An action in conversion for damages for unlawful re-
possession of an automobile, is not one to recover possession of a specific
chattel, as provided in subdivision 5, so as to warrant summary judg-
ment. 4 Under subdivision 8, summary judgment may be granted for
an accounting only if it arises on a written contract. 15 It may embrace
actions for accounting arising out of express trusts other than those of a
testamentary nature.'0 It may not be granted where the cause of action
is based upon negligence, misfeasance or malfeasance.
Since the Civil Practice Act by Sections 248 and 355, relieves a de-
fendant from verifying an answer in an action for a penalty, such an
action was specifically excluded from the scope of the rule. (Subdivision
3). An interesting question arises in connection with an action under
Section 51 of the Civil Rights Law for violation of the right of privacy.
The writer held that summary judgment would not lie in such an action,
because, while it may not be for a penalty, it is based upon a wrongful
act which is punishable as a misdemeanor.'" Another justice at Special
Term held otherwise.'
Rule 113 No Violation of Right to Trial by Jury
Two early cases disposed of the contention that Rule 113 operated as
a denial of the right to trial by jury. In General Investment Co. v.
Interborough Rapid Transit Co. the court said:
"The argument that Rule 113 infringes upon the right of trial by jury guar-
anteed by the Constitution cannot be sustained. The rule in question is simply
one regulating and prescribing procedure, whereby the court may summarily
determine whether or not a bona fide issue exists between the parties to the
action. A determination by the court that such issue is presented requires the
denial of an application for summary judgment and trial of the issue by jury at
the election of either party. On the other hand, if the pleadings and affidavits
of plaintiff disclose that no defense exists to the cause of action, and a de-
fendant, as in the instant case, fails to controvert such evidence and establish
by affidavit or proof that it has a real defense and should be permitted to
13. Bishop v. Spector, 150 Misc. 360, 365, 269 N. Y. Supp. 76, 81 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
14. Gilbert v. Gotham Credit Corp., 152 Misc. 598, 273 N. Y. Supp. 815 (App. Term
1st Dep't 1934).
15. Bimberg v. Unity Coat & Apron Co., 151 Misc. 442, 220 N. Y. Supp. 578 (Sup Ct.
1933).
16. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. The Charity Organization Society of the City of
New York, 238 App. Div. 720; 265 N. Y. Supp. 267 (1st Dep't 1933), aff'd, 264 N. Y.
441, 191 N. E. 504 (1934); Klein v. Horowitz, 240 App. Div. 495, 270 N. Y. Supp. 834
(1st Dep't 1934). See Finch, Summary Judgment Procedure (1933) 19 A. B. A. J., 504, 508.
17. Perro v. New Metropolitan Fictions, Inc., N. Y. L. J. Oct. 20, 1932, at 1623.
18. Luckner v. Association Sports Clubs, Inc., N. Y. L. J. Aug. 9, 1932, at 492.
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defend, the court may determine that no issue triable by jury exists between
the parties and grant a summary judgment."'9
In Hanna v. Mitchell, it was said:
"It is not the object of this rule to deprive any one who has a right to a jury
trial of an issue of fact, but to require a defendant, when it is claimed that in
fact he has no honest defense and no bona fide issue, to show that he has at
least an arguable defense, that he has not merely taken advantage of a tech-
nicality in the form of pleading for the purpose of delaying the enforcement
of an honest claim to which in fact he has no colorable defense. The court does
not try the issues but ascertains whether in fact there is an issue... . As we
have already stated, the requirement that an issue of fact in the actions
enumerated in section 425 must be tried by a jury, does not deprive the court
of the power to ascertain whether there is in truth an issue of fact to be tried.
To say that a false denial, which defendants are unable to justify, must never-
theless put the plaintiff to his common-law proof -before a jury, although the
result would be a directed verdict in plaintiff's favor as a matter of law, is to
exalt the shadow above the substance.""-O
Difference between Summary Judgment and .Motion
To Strike out as Sham
Despite earlier cases taking a more liberal view, it soon became settled
law in this state that the general issue could not be stricken out as sham;
that a verified pleading could not be stricken out as sham, if it contained
a denial of any material allegation of the complaint, although shown by
affidavits to be false; and that an answer was not frivolous unless it
appeared on mere inspection to be bad. An issue raised by false aflirma-
tive defense could be tested by a motion to strike out as sham, but an
issue raised by a false denial could not. A denial of knowledge or in-
formation sufficient to form a belief would, in a proper case, authorize
the granting of a judgment against the defendant, as presumptively false,
while a denial that was actually false was immune from attack.2'
These, it was pointed out in a leading case:
"were distinctions that seem to lack substance, and to be contrary to the
intent and purpose of code pleading, which was to do away with the technical
and artificial issues of the common law system, and substitute a system of
pleading based upon a statement of the facts of the cause of action, and truth-
ful denials thereof or defenses thereto. A fictitious denial, the effect of which
19. 235 N. Y. 133, 142, 143, 139 N. E. 216, 220 (1923). See also Fidelity & Deposit
Co. v. United States, 187 U. S. 315, 319-321 (1902); Ex Parte Peterson, 253 U. S. 300,
309 (1920).
20. Hanna v. Mitchell, 202 App. Div. 504, 517, 518, 196 N. Y. Supp. 43, 52 (1st DCp't
1922), aff'd, 235 N. Y. 534, 139 N. E. 724 (1923).
21. Wayland v. Tysen, 45 N. Y. 281 (1S71); Thompson v. Erie R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 463,
(1871); Cook v. Warren, 88 N. Y. 37 (1S82); Dahlstrom v. Gemunder, 198 N. Y. 449, 92
N. E. 106 (1910); Kirschbaum v. Eschman, 205 N. Y. 127, 98 N. E. 328 (1912).
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was merely intended to force the plaintiff to prove his cause before a jury,
has no place in the Code system of pleading. It was a relic of the artificial
common-law pleading which had persisted because of the resistance of the courts
to the expressed will of the Legislature. With the intention of doing away with
this technicality and fruitful source of delay and expense to the enforcement
of a just and legal claim to which there was no defense in fact, the convention
adopted rules 113 and 114."'22
Under the old rule, pleadings, generally speaking, were taken at their
face value, but under the rule we are considering "they are appraised
at their real value, and may be challenged by affidavits, and must then
be sustained by proof by affidavits of the actual facts.12 1
Practice on Motions for Summary Judgment
Motions for summary judgment are made on the usual five days' no-
tice of motion. There is no occasion to bring on the application by an
order to show cause. If the ordinary notice of mQtion is given, the
answering affidavits are generally not served until the return day of the
motion. In that event, it is senseless for the moving party to attempt to
argue the motion until he has carefully examined the affidavits in op-
position. Even if he desires to submit without argument, he should like-
wise examine the papers in opposition in order that he may apply, if
necessary, for leave to serve a reply affidavit.
If the moving party desires to avail himself of the answering affidavits
before the return day of the motion, he should, under Rule 64, give
his opponent ten days' notice of motion, and in his notice set forth his
demand that answering affidavits be served at least five days before the
hearing. If not so served, they will not be allowed to be filed or read
in opposition, unless the court, for good cause shown, shall otherwise
direct. When the answering affidavits are served within the time pre-
scribed by the Rule, the moving party may serve reply affidavits at least
two days before the hearing.
It is regrettable that some attorneys ignore the requirements of Rule
64, and even when given the longer notice of motion, refrain from serv-
ing answering affidavits until the return day and then rely on the
liberality of the court to allow them to be filed. Sooner or later such
tactics will result in disaster. The rule is a reasonable one and should
22. Dwan v. Massarene, 199 App. Div. 872, 877, 878, 192 N. Y. Supp. 577, 581 (lst
Dep't 1922). See also General Investment Co. v. I. R. T. Co., 235 N. Y. 133, 137, 139 N.
E. 216, 218 (1923); Lowe v. Plainfield Trust Co., 216 App. Div. 72, 76, 215 N. Y. Supp.
50, 54 (1st Dep't 1926). On the subject of the rule making power of the Supreme Court,
see General Investment Co. v. I. R. T. Co., 235 N. Y. 133, 143, 139 N. E. 216, 220 (1923);
Hanna v. Mitchel, 202 App. Div. 504, 513, 196 N. Y. Supp. 43 (1st Dep't 1922), afi'd 235
N. Y. $34, 139 N. E. 724 (1923); cf. Riglander v. Star Co., 98 App. Div. 101, 104, 90 N.
Y. Supp. 772 (1st Dep't 1904), aff'd, 181 N. Y. 531, 73 N. E. 1131 (1905).
23. Palermo v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co., 201 N. Y. Supp. 106, 107 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
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be complied with, in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary.
In an early case, it was observed that upon a motion for summary
judgment under Rule 113, the practice of submitting successive affidavits
piecing and stringing out the assumed right of summary judgment, re-
solves itself into a trial by affidavit, creates a condition which ought not
to obtain, and is, therefore, of doubtful propriety. "  Without being
dogmatic, it may safely be asserted, that if it is necessary to reply to
the opposing affidavit, the chances are that a triable issue of fact is pres-
ent, even if, to use an expression of Lord Esher, the defense is "crumbly."
In many cases, however, a reply affidavit serves a useful purpose. As
will be pointed out more fully later, the moving party in his original
affidavit is called upon to set forth all the facts showing that he has a
good cause of action and that there is no real defense thereto. The
practice of withholding some essential facts for reply, is frowned upon
by the courts, for generally speaking, the opposing party is not called
upon, indeed he may not have the opportunity, to answer new matter
set up in a replying affidavit.
In anticipation of possible applications under Rule 113, both sides
should consider the advisability of proceeding promptly with necessary
depositions, examinations before trial and with appropriate motions for
discovery and inspection and bills of particulars. It may be necessary,
under certain conditions, to resort to Rule 120, of the Rules of Civil
Practice making provision for the appointment of a referee, to take the
deposition of a person who has refused to make an affidavit of the facts
believed to be within his knowledge, and whose affidavit is necessary for
a party who intends to make or to oppose a motion in a court of record.
There is no limitation of time for making a motion for summary
judgment. When there is an intention to limit the time, it is expressly
stated in the Rule. No limitation is found either in Rule 112 providing
for judgment on the pleadings, or in Rule 113. With respect to the
former, it has been held that there is no limitation of time within which
to make the motion. The same is true with respect to Rule 113.
"Motions such as these" it has been said, "should be encouraged and should
not be barred by unnecessary limitations of time within which they should be
made. It is in the interest of litigants to get all preliminary motions out of
the way as soon as practicable, and the general motion for that purpose, exist-
ing in other jurisdictions, might well be followed in this state... There is, of
course, the omnibus motion (Civ. Prac. Act. § 117), but that is not the same
as the general motion referred to. There is still too much of the ancient
atmosphere about our practice." 20
24. See Twigg v. Twigg, 117 Alisc. 154, 156, 191 N. Y. Supp. 781, 782 (Sup. Ct. 1921),
aff'd, 202 App. Div. 729, 193 N. Y. Supp. 956 (2d Dep't 1922).
25. Richardson v. Gregory, 219 App. Div. 211, 219 N. Y. Supp. 397 (4th Dep't 1927),
aff'd, 245 N. Y. 540, 157 N. E. 849 (1927).
26. Saunders v. Delario, 135 Alisc. 455, 456, 238 N. Y. Supp. 337, 338 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
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A motion in the Municipal Court of the City of New York, by the
plaintiff for summary judgment, supported by affidavits thereby verify-
ing the cause of action, may be granted even if the complaint is not
verified. 7 On a motion for summary judgment, it is improper to make
findings of fact and conclusions of law. There is "no justification there-
for until after a trial of the issues by the court (Civ. Prac. Act, § 440) . ,, 28
The court has the power to order notes and documents to be impounded
subject to its further order2- When the motion is granted, the entry of
both an order and a judgment is good practice.3" If upon a motion made
on behalf of a defendant, it should appear that the plaintiff is entitled
to judgment, the judge hearing the motion may award judgment to the
plaintiff although he has not made a cross motion therefor. (Rule 113,
as amended.)
Our Rule 113 did not adopt the provision of the New Jersey Rule 60
(patterned on English Order XIV), which reads: "Leave to defend may
be given unconditionally, or upon such terms as to giving security, or
time, or mode of trial, or otherwise, as may be deemed just." A motion
for summary judgment, therefore, must be either granted or denied with-
out conditions."' It cannot be denied on condition that the parties con-
sent to an immediate trial, although proposals which have been made to
give the court discretion to impose such a condition, merit careful con-
sideration. Nor has the court any power to grant the motion with a
proviso that the defendent deposit in court the amount sued for, or
furnish a surety company bond. "The function of the remedy of sum-
mary judgment is to grant forthwith judgment in those cases where no
triable issue is raised, and it cannot be extended to cover cases in which,
though a triable issue is raised, the parties are 'protected' by the filing
of a surety company bond.""2 Upon the granting of a motion for sum-
mary judgment, the court has the power to stay execution as in the case
of a judgment after trial. The usual practice is to allow a stay of from
five to ten days in contested motions, and two or three days where the
motion has been granted on default.
3 3
27. Mosca v. Parker-Aeolus Inc., 130 Misc. 186, 223 N. Y. Supp. 684 (Mun. Ct. 1927).
28. Brescia Construction Co. Inc. v. Walart Construction Co., Inc., 238 App. Div. 360,
367, 264 N. Y. Supp. 862, 871 (1st Dep't 1933).
29. General Investment Co. v. Interborough R. T. Co., 235 N. Y. 133, 144, 139 N. E.
216, 220 (1923).
30. See Weinberg v. Goldstein, 226 App. Div. 479, 480, 235 N. Y. Supp. 529, 531 (4th
Dep't 1929); Donnelly v. Bauder, 217 App. Div. 59, 62, 216 N. Y. Supp. 437, 440 (4th
Dep't 1926).
31. Gibson v. Standard Automobile Co., 208 App. Div. 91, 203 N. Y. Supp. 53 (1st
Dep't 1924).
32. 60 West Fifty-third St. Corp. v. Haskel, 231 App. Div. 62, 64, 246 N. Y. Supp. 360,
363 (1st Dep't 1930). See also Gibson v. Standard Automobile Co., 208 App. Dlv. 91, 203
N. Y. Supp. 53 (1st Dep't 1924).
33. See e.g., General Investment Co. v. Interborough R. T. Co., 235 N, Y. 133, 144,
139 N. E. 216, 220 (1923).
[Vol. 4
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Effect of Serving an Amended Answer after Motion is Made
Originally, it was the practice to mark a motion for summary judg-
ment off the calendar, if it appeared that after the motion was made, an
amended answer was served in time, regardless of the character of the
amendment. Inevitably, this led to abuse in obstructing the collection of
just claims. The Appellate Division, in Gordon Corp. v. Cosman,
severely condemned these tactics and held that to defeat the pending
motion, the amendment must be something substantial and real, and
not a mere change in form. The court said:
"The mere service of a new pleading, if it be merely colorable, will not of
itself suffice. It becomes necessary accordingly to examine its allegations to
determine whether it is a genuine and sincere amended answer or was interposed
in bad faith merely restating in a different form allegations of fact shown to
be sham when set forth in the earlier pleading. If the latter, inasmuch as it is
substantiated by no accompanying proof of fact, it will not be held to be a
genuine amended answer.34
"The question before us is whether or not such tactics can prevail to impede
the orderly administration of justice. Was the court required to regard
seriously the new unsupported pleading and stamp it as tendering, in the
counterclaim, a real issue to be tried out? Must the forms of law be gone
through with, and the time of the court and counsel wasted, merely because a
frivolous separate defense, which has been proven to be sham, is turned, in an
amended answer, into an unsupported counterclaim? If defendant expected to
have this counter claim seriously considered as an honest pleading he should
have accompanied it with affidavits tending to support the affirmative aver-
ments, thereby showing a triable issue." 35
General Application of the Rde. What Is a Triable Issue?
In an early case in England, under Order XIV, on which the original
Rule 113 was patterned, Mr. Justice Manisty observed, "that it was most
important that Order XIV, which, if properly acted on, was most bene-
ficial to the suitors by saving unnecessary litigation, should not be per-
verted to the trial of disputed questions of fact upon affidavits. He had
the greatest distrust of affidavits upon disputed questions of fact, and
would never consent to try such questions upon affidavit. The affidavits
were contradictory, and he was struck with the remark of one of the
Judges that 'there must be perjury on one side or the other.' How was
it to be tried on which side was the perjury? How could that be tried
upon affidavits? Upon such a conflict of affidavits it was only just that
34. Gordon Corp. v. Cosman, 232 App. Div. 230, 2S3, 249 N. Y. Supp. 544, 547 (Ist
Dep't 1931).
35. Id. at 234, 249 N. Y. Supp. at 548.
1935]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the defendant should be allowed the opportunity of defending the action
upon the merits, and that without any condition.""0
Lord Halsbury wrote that the proceeding established by that order is
"a peculiar proceeding, intended only to apply to cases where there can
be no reasonable doubt that a plaintiff is entitled to judgment, and where,
therefore, it is inexpedient to allow a defendant to defend for mere
purposes of delay.' '3 7
Lord Esher said that "the rule which had always been acted upon...
in considering cases under Order XIV was that the summary jurisdiction
conferred by that order must be used with great care. A defendant
ought not to be shut out from defending unless it was very clear indeed
that he had no case ...." The test he laid down was that if the defense
was "so far plausible that it was not unreasonably possible for it to
succeed if brought to trial, it ought not to be excluded." 38 Lord James
in a comparatively recent case stated: "I think Order XIV is a very
useful process indeed, but it has to be used with very great care and
must never be used unless it is clear that there is no real substantial
question to be tried." 9
Our courts at the outset, adopted the view expressed in the English
cases. The power under Rule 113, it was held, "must be exercised with
care and not extended beyond its just limits. The court is not authorized
to try the issue, but is to determine whether there is an issue to be
tried. If there is, it must be tried by a jury."4
To justify summary relief "the court must be convinced that the issue
is not genuine, but feigned, and that tere is in truth nothing to be
tried. . . . The remedy is to be administered in furtherance of jus-
tice." '41 In varying terms, the courts express the view that to constitute a
triable issue, it must appear from facts adduced in the moving papers
and answering affidavits that there is no "real defense,"4 no "genuine
or substantial issue created,"' no "substantial issue of fact. ' 44 Even if
he has "an apparent defense, he should be allowed to defend. '40 How-
36. Saw v. Hakim, 5 L. T. R. 72, 73 (1888).
37. See Jones v. Stone [1894J A. C. 122, 124.
38. See Sheppards & Co. v. Wilkinson & Jarvis, 6 L. T. R. 13, 13 (1889).
39. Codd v. Delap, 92 L. T. R. 510 (1905).
40. Dwan v. Massarene, 199 App. Div. 872, 879, 192 N. Y. Supp. 577, 582 (1st Dep't
1922). See also, General Investment Co. v. Interborough R. T. Co., 235 N. Y. 133, 143, 139
N. E. 216, 220 (1923).
41. Curry v. Mackenzie, 239 N. Y. 267, 270, 272, 146 N. E. 375, 376, 376 (1925).
42. Commonwealth Fuel Co. v. Powpit Co. Inc., 212 App. Div. 553, 557, 209 N. Y.
Supp. 603, 607 (2d Dep't 1925).
43. Gravenhorst v. Zimmerman, 236 N. Y. 22, 27, 139 N. E. 766, 768, (1923).
44. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of U. S., 259 N. Y. 365, 368, 182 N. E. 18,
19 (1932).
45. General Investment Co. v. I. R. T. Co., 235 N. Y. 133, 139t 139 N. E. 216, 218
(1923).
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ever, it must be "a bona fide defense to the action, one which he may be
able to establish. It must be a plausible ground of defense, something
fairly arguable and of a substantial character."4
"Phantom issues" will not suffice. A shadowy semblance of an issue is
not enough to defeat the motion. "The very object of a motion for sum-
mary judgment is to separate what is formal or pretended in denial or
averment from what is genuine or substantial, so that only the latter
may subject a suitor to the burden of a trial."47
"Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice would serve no purpose whatever if
frivolous and transparently insufficient proofs and arguments such as have been
brought forward here be held to create a triable issue. The already over-
crowded trial term calendars would be cluttered up with phantom issues, the
disposition of which would usurp and waste the time of the court. A defendant
must show real and substantial facts 'sufficient to entitle him to defend'
(Rule 113) if he is to avert summary judgment under these rules which were
carefully devised to eliminate unnecessary delay and further the prompt
administration of justice." 48
We are, however, constantly warned not to grant summary relief, if
conflicting affidavits are presented; that it would be an unwarranted use
of the rule to pass on questions of credibility or weight of evidence.
"It is quite evident that the statements in the affidavits are at variance
with each other. It may be that at the trial some of the affiants will be
unable to stand the test of cross-examination, a frequent result which
has emphasized not only the danger of deciding issues of fact on af-
fidavits, but the advisability of sending such issues to trial where the
witnesses may be subjected to the test of cross-examination and their
testimony scrutinized with care by the trial justice or the jury."40
Section 457a of the Civil Practice Act, providing that "the judge may
direct a verdict when he would set aside a contrary verdict as against the
weight of the evidence," should have no application to a motion for
summary judgment00 Otherwise the judge, in effect, would be trying a
case on affidavits, instead of allowing the witnesses to be subjected
to the test of cross-examination.
Complicated Questions of Law
The presence of a difficult question of law, does not operate to defeat
summary judgment.
46. Dwan v. Mlassarene, 199 App. Div. 872, 8S0, 192 N. Y. Supp. 577, 582 (Ist Dep't
1922).
47. Richard v. Credit Suisse, 242 N. Y. 346, 350, 152 N. E. 110, 111 (1926).
48. Strasburger v. Rosenheim, 234 App. Div. 544, 547, 255 N. Y. Supp. 316, 320 (1st
Dep't 1932).
49. Afiner v. Reinhardt, 225 App. Div. 530, 534, 233 N. Y. Supp. 592, 595, 596 (1t
Dep't 1929).
S0. Contra: Seedgrower v. Jones, 223 N. Y. Supp. 785 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
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"The theory of our amended rules and procedure was to simplify the practice.
The demurrer was eliminated. Where the answer raises an issue the plaintiff
cannot have judgment on the pleadings. And if in reality there be no issue of
fact, as may be shown by affidavits, but only a question of law there is no way
of having that question determined prior to the trial unless it may be done by
virtue of rule 113. Certainly it can be disposed of with less delay under that
rule than by waiting for the case to be reached for trial. I think where there is
no question of fact involved that a motion for summary judgment under rule
113 may properly be considered even though an important question of law has
to be determined."51
The Affidavits Generally
Affidavits to be used on a motion for summary judgment should be
prepared with great care. They should be drawn, only after the case
has been fully gone over with those familiar with the facts, and the
important documentary evidence examined. It is most unwise to pre-
pare such affidavits hastily, after a casual discussion of the facts. Not
only may the affidavits so drawn fail to serve their purpose on the
motion, but if the application for summary relief is denied, any mis-
statements in the affidavits, although made unintentionally, may count
heavily against the client on the trial. When affidavits are prepared,
that should always be kept in mind.
The affidavit should proceed in logical sequence. State whether the
affiant is twenty-one or over-if not, give his exact age, his address, his
present occupation and connection with the case. Then state clearly and
concisely the facts, the evidentiary facts, not ultimate facts or con-
clusions, of which the affiant has personal knowledge. The fact that it
is stated as a conclusion that the affiant has personal knowledge of the
facts will not suffice. The facts as set forth in the affidavit must show
that he has such knowledge. Time and again judges are obliged to
ask themselves-what is there to show that the affiant has personal
knowledge about the various things he is telling us? Let the affidavit
follow substantially the same form as though the affiant were giving testi-
mony in court. That is always the safe way to proceed.
Some affidavits remind one of jig-saw puzzles. The facts may all be
there, but you have to search for the different pieces and put them to-
gether. If the court fails to find one of the scattered pieces, the
attorney has himself to blame. Do not submit a memorandum on the
law in the guise of an affidavit. It is futile to fill in, or seek to bolster up
an affidavit weak on the facts, by the citation of legal authorities.
Every original document or instrument submitted on the motion,
S1. Coutts v. Kraft, 119 Misc. 260, 261, 196 N. Y. Supp. 135, 136, 137 (Sup. Ct. 1922),
aff'd, 206 App. Div. 625, 198 N. Y. Supp. 908 (2d Dep't 1923). But see Electric General
Contract Corp. v. Thomas-Houston Electric Co., 10 L. T. R. 103 (1893).
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should be marked as an exhibit.52 The affidavit should recite that the
original will be exhibited to the court and should identify the document,
describing its character, giving its date and, if recorded, the liber and
page number. Generally it is advisable to attach a copy, photostatic
or otherwise, to the affidavit. It is important that the order disposing of
the motion, recite all original documents exhibited to and considered
by the court, in arriving at its determination. When this is not done,
and the documents have not been marked, there is often a controversy
on appeal, as to what papers were actually before the court.
Do not, in an affidavit give the contents of a paper, which presumably
should be in your possession, without attaching the original, or a copy,
or explaining why this cannot be done. Thus, do not say "In a letter
addressed to me the defendant admitted," etc. Attach the letter or
explain why you cannot do so. It is only if neither the original, nor a
copy, is available that the contents of the paper should be stated. If
the letter was addressed to a third party, state when, where and under
what circumstances the affiant saw it, who now has the original, and what
efforts were made to obtain the original or a copy.
The Moving Affidavit
The basis of summary judgment, is that the moving party have a
good pleading, supported by his affidavit or that of any other person
having knowledge of the facts, setting forth such evidentiary facts, if
the motion is by plaintiff, as shall establish the cause of action and
negative the defense interposed, or if by defendant, show that the
denials or defenses are sufficient to defeat plaintiff. While the court is
ever on the alert to find that sufficient facts are alleged to defeat the
motion, it is most critical of the moving affidavit, and if that fails to
comply in every way with the requirement of the Rule, the motion falls.
There is a specific requirement that the moving affidavit set forth
evidenitiary facts. That means just what it says; conclusions of fact,
or ultimate facts will not suffice. If an allegation of the complaint is
admitted by the answer, no verification thereof is necessary in the
moving affidavit. The facts showing that there is a good cause of action
as alleged in the complaint, must be set forth with particularity and by
one having actual knowledge. Thus where delivery of merchandise sued
for, is in issue, it will not do to state merely that the goods were delivered.
Proof of delivery should be set forth either in the affidavit or by other
documents. Not only must the particulars of the cause of action be set
forth clearly and unequivocally, but it must be done by one who would
be in a position to testify concerning them at a trial.
52. Cf. General Investment Co. v. Interborough R. T. Co., 235 N. Y. 133, 144, 139 N. E.
216, 220 (1923).
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The courts have repeatedly emphasized this requirement:
"Plaintiff's affidavit is made by its attorney and not by a person having
knowledge of the facts, and it does not state the matters which under rule 113
the affidavit is required to state.
"For these reasons, and in spite of the fact that the defendant fails to show
any facts sufficient to entitle him to defend, the plaintiff's motion must be
denied, but without costs and without prejudice to a new motion for the same
relief."53
"Civil Practice Rule 113 permits summary judgment at times in favor of a
plaintiff though material averments of his complaint have been traversed by
the answer. To that end there must be supporting affidavits proving the cause
of action, and that clearly and completely by affiants who speak with
knowledge"' 54
"... The facts stated in the affidavit of the plaintiff or other person having
knowledge of them who would be competent to testify to the facts upon the
trial, must prove the cause of action stated in the complaint to be true. It is
not enough to show that there might be a liability of the defendant to the
plaintiff on other facts different from those alleged.
"We must bear in mind that the rule permits a summary and drastic remedy
which can only be invoked by those who demonstrate that they are clearly
entitled to the relief." 55
So a moving affidavit was held insufficient where it repeated an
allegation of the complaint "that by reason of the failure of the defendant
to show title to the aforesaid premises free from material defect, the said
loan was not consummated." This it was held was at best a statement
of ultimate and not of evidentiary fact. What was the defect in title
claimed to be material? The moving party should have stated it with
particularity.
The moving affidavit in an action on a promissory note recited "That
the said promissory note was taken and received by the plaintiff in the
ordinary and usual course of its business prior to maturity and the
plaintiff is the owner and holder of said note in due course." This it was
held ".. . may be sufficient for a pleading, but in an affidavit for a sum-
mary judgment where a defense has been interposed of the nature here
53. Davison Coal Co. Inc., v. Interstate Coal & Dock Co., 193 N. Y. Supp. 883, 885
(Sup. Ct. 1921).
54. Curry v. Mackenzie, 239 N. Y. 267, 269, 146 N. E. 375, 375 (1925). See also,
Lonsky v. Bank of U. S., 220 App. Div. 194, 221 N. Y. Supp. 177 (1st Dep't 1927). State
Bank v. Mackstein, 123 Misc. 416, 417, 205 N. Y. Supp. 290, 291 (App. Term 1st Dep't
1924).
55. Hallgarten v. Wolkenstein, 204 App. Div. 487, 490, 491, 198 N. Y. Supp. 485, 487
(1st Dep't 1923); ci. Romine v. Barnaby Agency, Inc., 131 Misc. 696, 227 N. Y. Supp.
235 (Sup. Ct. 1928); Jacobs v. Korpus, 128 Misc. 445, 218 N. Y. Supp. 314 (App, Term
2d Dep't 1926); Davison Coal Co., Inc. v. Interstate Coal & Dock Co., 193 N. Y. Supp.
883 (Sup. Ct. 1921); Brescia Construction Co. Inc v. Walart Construction Co. Inc., 238
App. Div. 360, 264 N. Y. Supp. 862 (1st Dep't 1933) (failure to set forth evidentlary facts
and to submit important papers held fatal).
[Vol, 4
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
pleaded, I believe further facts should affirmatively appear giving the
name of the payee, whether the note was endorsed and discounted in
good faith, the time of discounting, the value paid therefor and that it
was received by the present alleged owner and holder thereof without
notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the per-
son negotiating it. In other words, a full and complete disclosure by the
plaintiff of all facts should be presented to the court, showing the plain-
tiff's ownership and title to the note and negativing the defense in-
terposed." 6
Perhaps the mistake most frequently made in moving affidavits, is to
hold back important facts substantiating the claim, intending, of course,
to use them if necessary in a replying affidavit. It is part of the general
tendency to conceal, rather than to reveal, the case or any more of it than
is felt to be absolutely necessary. This may lead to unfortunate results
if it is resorted to on application for summary judgment. Generally
speaking, resort should be had to a reply affidavit: (1) where the answer-
ing affidavit sets up an issue not raised by the opponent's pleading or in
conflict therewith; (2) where facts are set up in the answering affidavit,
which the moving party could not reasonably anticipate, particularly
when such facts are contradicted by documentary proof or matters of
record.
One moving for summary judgment should be prepared to put his
cards on the table, and to anticipate a defense which may be interposed.
A typical instance is where the moving affidavit sets forth the bare facts
of a sale and delivery of merchandise and non-payment. The answering
affidavit sets up a sale by sample and that the goods delivered did not
conform to the sample. The moving party in reply then submits docu-
mentary evidence showing satisfaction expressed by the vendee with the
quality of the merchandise and asking for quotations on a re-order.
In an action for money loaned, the loan and its non-payment are set
forth in the moving affidavit. The answering affidavit states that no
loan was ever made. Then the moving party in a replying affidavit
attaches a letter from the defendant promising to pay if granted a little
time. It frequently happens also, that a plaintiff suing on an assigned
claim withholds the affidavit of the assignor from his original moving
papers and submits it in reply. These are extreme instances, but typical.
The practice is bad and dangerous. The Court may not grant leave to
submit a reply affidavit on a motion of this character. The tendency
is to discourage numerous cross-affidavits. Even if the reply affidavit
is allowed, if new matter is included, it may be disregarded, unless it
clearly appears that there has been an opportunity to answer the new
matter. The mistake should not be made, of withholding important facts
56. Farmers Nat. Bank v. Williams, 117 Misc. 567, 569, 570, 192 N. Y. Supp. 40, 41
(Sup. Ct. 1921).
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from the original affidavit. If for any reason that situation has de-
veloped, make sure that the record indicates that the opponent has had
ample opportunity to reply to such new matter, and failed without ex-
planation to avail himself of it. Above all, set forth all the documentary
evidence in support of the motion. While the opposing party may
explain away an admission of liability, it will have to be a plausible
explanation, in order to satisfy the court. 7
Belief of the Moving Party that There Is no Defense to the Action
Or that the Action Has no Merit
Under the original Rule, it was required that the person having
knowledge of the facts and making the affidavit in support of thd motion
should state therein "his belief that there is no defense to the action."
When the Rule was amended so as to permit a defendant to move for
summary judgment, it was required that an affidavit of the moving party
or of any other person having knowledge of the facts be submitted,
"together with the belief of the moving party either that there is no
defense to the action or that the action has no merit as the case may be."
Although the question has not yet been raised, I do not believe that
the amendment contemplated any new requirement in this regard. How-
ever, in view of the change of language indicated, it might be well, where
the supporting affidavit is made by a person other than a party, to
incorporate not only the belief of the affiant that there is no defense to
the action or that the action has no merit, but to attach an affidavit by
the moving party himself, to the same effect. In any event, a statement
setting forth this belief should be included in the moving affidavit. Where
this has not been done, it has been held that the moving papers were
insufficient, that the requirements of the rule were not met, and that the
motion had to be denied.58
Try to follow the language of the Rule. While it has been held that
the precise words of the Rule do not constitute a magic formula, and it
is sufficient if they are set forth in substance,"0 there is no reason why
there should ever be any controversy on this subject. Hardly a month
passes without having this question raised in the Appellate Term. Surely,
it is no great hardship to the bar, to use the language of the Rule, although
the requirement seems to be merely one of form.
57. Saw v. Hakim, 5 L. T. R. 72, 72 (1888); Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking
Corp. v. Lazard-Godchau of America Inc., 207 App. Div. 174, 201 N. Y. Supp. 771 (1st
Dep't 1923), aff'd, 239 N. Y. 610y 147 N. E. 216 (1925).
58. First Trust & Deposit Co. v. Holt & Thomas Inc., 236 App. Div. 714, 258 N. Y
Supp. 1002 (4th Dep't 1932). See Bevelyn Realty Corp. v. Brooklyn Construction Co.
Inc., 140 Misc. 74, 249 N. Y. Supp. 41 (App. Term 2d Dep't 1930).
59. 130 East 75th St. Corp v. Freeman, No. 3 c. c. Oct. 1934 (App. Term 1st Dep't)
(holding that the precise language is unnecessary since there was substantial compliance).
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Variance Between Pleading and Proof of the Moving Party
The moving party cannot prevail, if his pleading is defective or if
the facts set forth in the moving affidavit do not support the allegations
of the pleading. The facts set forth "must prove the cause of action
stated in the complaint to be true. It is not enough to show that there
might be a liability of the defendant to the plaintiff on other facts
different from those alleged.1 c6 An action was brought to recover
certain payments alleged to be due to the plaintiff under the provisions of
a separation agreement dated November 1, 1929. The amended answer
set up as a defense, a partial modification of the original agreement by
a supplemental agreement dated May 28, 1931. Plaintiff moved to strike
out this defense as sham and for summary judgment. This motion was
denied. On appeal, the court held:
"The very persuasive argument of appellant's counsel would very likely lead
to its logical conclusion had the complaint set up a cause of action based on this
superseding supplementary agreement. But the cause of action alleged in the
complaint cannot be the basis of a new and distinct cause of action set forth
in the plaintiff's affidavits and result in a summary judgment not contemplated
in the original pleadings. The fault lies with the pleader, and the remedy is
only by amendment or a trial." 61
In another case the complaint was based on an actual lease and not on
any claim of attornment; the latter claim was urged in the moving
affidavit and tended to contradict the claim made in the complaint itself.
The court held:
"On a motion for summary judgment there must be a good complaint which
is supported and proved by the affidavits submitted. As the record stands,
there is a manifest variance between the pleadings and the proofY*02
The court refused to amend the complaint to conform to the facts set
up in the opposing affidavit.
While the foregoing represent the general rule, there are some cases
in which typographical errors, technical or trivial defects in a complaint,
have been disregarded on a motion for summary judgment, and the
complaint amended to conform to the facts alleged in the affidavit.
Where there was an obvious error in a date in the complaint, the plaintiff
who moved for summary judgment, in connection therewith, asked to
have the date corrected. The court granted the application and for
the purposes of the motion for summary judgment directed that the
date be deemed corrected.'
60. Hollgarten v. Wolkenstein, 204 App. Div. 487, 490, 491, 198 N. Y. Supp. 485, 487
(1st Dep't 1923).
61. Burgin v. Ryan, 23S App. Div. 122, 123, 263 N. Y. Supp. 242, 243 (2d D]ep' 1933).
62. Max Rice Realty Co. v. V/G Sandwich Shop Inc., 239 App. Div. 472, 474, 267
N. Y. Supp. 863, 866 (1st Dep't 1933).
63. Schroeder v. Columbia Casualty Co., 126 Mlisc. 205, 213 N. Y. Supp. 649 (Sup. Ct.
1925).
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In McAnsh v. Blauner, the court said:
"It appears without contradiction that the note was given pursuant to a
written contract as part consideration for the purchase of real estate in Florida
and that by the law of Florida eight percent is the legal rate of interest. The
over-technical, dilatory and unsubstantial contention of the defendant that
summary judgment should not be ordered because of failure to allege the law
of Florida in the complaint merits not even passing consideration in a court of
justice. We have no hesitation in considering this a typical case for amendment
as of course under Section 105 of the Civil Practice Act and the complaint is
deemed amended accordingly."6 4
In Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Broadway John Corporation, the plaintiff's
affidavits showed the making of a lease of the building, except the store,
and the failure to pay the accrued rent therein stipulated. The de-
fendant sought "to justify its denial and its complete failure to show any
vestige of a triable issue by the bald statement that because of the
clerical mistake of the pleader in describing the lease as covering the
entire building, when in fact it excluded the stores, it may delay the
plaintiff until it corrects this trivial error by a new complaint." The
court in granting summary judgment, held that "Section 105 of the Civil
Practice Act provides that where a substantial right of any party shall
not thereby be prejudiced, a mistake, omission, irregularity or defect
must be disregarded. That rule should receive a liberal and common
sense interpretation. In the exercise of the power thus conferred upon
it, the court should give no countenance to such dilatory methods as have
been attempted here by the defendant. We are justified in believing,
from defendant's failure so to assert a defense, that none exists."06
It cannot be emphasized too strongly, however, that while the court
may on a motion for summary judgment correct typographical errors,
or obvious trivial mistakes in the pleadings of a moving party, it will
not condone a variance between the pleading and the proof as set forth
in the moving affidavit. So in Wise v. Powell, the court held that a
motion for summary judgment was properly denied because "the reply
failed to allege the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction, which
plaintiff's motion papers disclose as the basis of his claim for the denial
to defendant of relief on the first and second counterclaims. . . . This
defense is not open to the plaintiff, without an amendment of his reply.""0
In a recent case in the Appellate Term, First Department, a complaint
was framed on the theory of full performance of a contract. The sup-
porting affidavit indicated that full performance was waived by a
modification of the contract. The Court held that the complaint would
not be amended to conform to the facts set forth in the moving affidavit
64. 222 App. Div. 381, 382, 226 N. Y. Supp. 379, 381 (lst Dep't 1928), aft'd, 248 N. Y.
537, 162 N. E. 515 (1928).
65. 220 App. Div. 195, 196, 221 N. Y. Supp. 189, 190 (1st Dep't 1927).
66. 216 App. Div. 618, 619, 215 N. Y. Supp. 693, 694 (4th Dep't 1926).
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and reversed an order granting summary judgment.67 It would therefore
be advisable, if in preparing motion papers for summary judgment, a
variance is found between the pleading and the facts, that the motion be
deferred until the pleading has been amended.
The Answering Affidavit
On a motion for summary judgment "a defendant is under no burden
to show that affirmative allegations in the defense are not sham when the
attack on such allegations is made solely on the ground that they are
insufficient in law.""8 So too, a defendant may rely on the insufficiency
of the complaint or of the moving affidavit. If the complaint is defective,
or if the moving papers fail to verify the cause of action alleged in the
complaint by evidentiary facts, the defendant or the opposing party is
not called upon to submit any answering affidavit."2 In such a situation,
even if the defendant submits an opposing affidavit, which is clearly
insufficient to raise a triable issue, the motion will nevertheless be
denied.
Rule 113, it has been held, "is not intended to shift the burden of
proof. The Rule specifically requires a moving affidavit 'of the plaintiff or
of any other person having knowledge of the facts verifying the cause
of action.' . . . It is only when such prima facie proof is made that
judgment may summarily be ordered upon the defendant's failure af-
firmatively to show the existence of a triable issue."7 0
The case of Sher v. Rodkin, clearly presented several important prob-
lems arising on these motions. The plaintiff alleged that he was
" . .. the owner and holder in due course of a certain promissory note
made by the defendant Charles Opper to the order of the defendant
Meyer Rodkin, dated June 13, 1922, for the sum of $250, and that
said note was transferred to the plaintiff in due course ... " The de-
fendant Charles Opper presented an affidavit stating facts sufficient to
show a defense as between the original parties and further set forth that
"the plaintiff also had knowledge and notice that the note would not be
paid, but nevertheless accepted an assignment thereof from the defendant
Rodkin with full knowledge of such fact. Deponent further says that
the plaintiff is not the holder in due course of said note, and that the said
67. Equipment & Supply Co. v. Hudson Contracting Co., No. 29 c. c. Jan. 1934.
68. Hessian Hills Country Club Inc., v. Home Ins. Co, 262 N. Y. 189, 196, 186 N. E.
439, 441 (1933).
69. Gubin v. City of New York, 276 N. Y. Supp. 51 (App. Term 2d Dep't 1934)
(motion denied though no opposing affidavit, because complaint is insufficient); Gellens
v. Continental Banking Trust Co., 241 App. Div. 591, 272 N. Y. Supp. 900 (Ist Dep't 1934)
(motion denied where moving affidavit fails to support allegation of complaint which was
challenged by answer).
70. Lonsky v. Bank of U. S., 220 App. Div. 194, 19S, 221 N. Y. Supp. 177, 179 (Ist
Dep't 1927).
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note was not assigned to him for value." The court held that the
affidavit presented by the plaintiff contained only a statement of those
ultimate facts necessary to make out a cause of action and that it failed
to state any evidentiary facts which would show that he is a holder for
value without notice. The Court said:
"The affidavit of the plaintiff herein merely sets forth a cause of action, but it
does not point out, except by allegations of ultimate fact, proper perhaps in a
complaint, but which are yet mere conclusions which must be drawn from
other facts, how he will sustain his cause of action. The answering affidavit
also contains only similar allegations of ultimate facts, and bare denials of the
plaintiff's allegations, which might well be considered insufficient if the plaintiff
had presented an affidavit stating the facts which he expects to prove in detail,
for then the defendant's affidavit would not constitute 'proof' which would
controvert the plaintiff's allegations.... Rule 113 was never intended to permit
a plaintiff to set forth in an affidavit merely those allegations which would be
required by a pleading to constitute a cause of action, and then to compel the
defendant to disclose the evidence which he expects to use to controvert such
proof as the plaintiff may present at the trial. The requirement of an affidavit
'verifying the cause of action' means an affidavit which will enable the judge to
determine whether the plaintiff has in fact a cause of action, which cannot be
controverted upon a trial, and in the present case the plaintiff presents no
facts from which the court can determine that the plaintiff's conclusions can
be established at the trial, and merely sets forth a cause of action, without
verifying it in such manner that the defendant can be called upon to present his
own proof before trial." 71
It may be asked what course a party in opposition to the motion should
take, when he is convinced that the moving papers are insufficient. That
is a serious responsibility, but an attorney is confronted with a similar
problem when he has to decide on the trial, whether he will rest at the
close of the plaintiff's case without offering any evidence. One thing
is clear however-an opposing party should not submit an inadequate
answering affidavit addressed to the facts, even if he relies on the in-
sufficiency of the moving papers. There is no sense to that. Either
submit no opposing affidavit dealing with the facts, or submit one that
goes fully into the facts and tends to support the opposition. Even if
convinced that the moving papers are insufficient, it is good judgment to
have an opposing affidavit on the merits, ready on the return day of the
motion. In such a situation the attorney should always ask to be heard
on the motion. If the court on the argument indicates that he is against
the contention made, ask for leave to submit the affidavit forthwith;
if he says he will reserve decision, ask for leave to submit the affidavit,
in the event that he should decide that the mo~ing papers are sufficient.
All I can say is, that if I represented a client who had a real, substantial
71. Sher v. Rodkin, 198 N. Y. Supp. 597, 598, 599 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1923).
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defense, I would submit his affidavit to that effect and not rely on the
insufficiency of the moving papers.
It has already been shown, that in order to defeat a motion for sum-
mary judgment, when the moving party has complied with the require-
ments of Rule 113, it is necessary for the opponent to set up, by affidavit
or other proof, facts showing what has been termed to be a real, or a
genuine or an arguable defense. What the attorney may say in his
argument in opposition is of no avail. A repetition of the language of
the answer is worthless. It will not suffice to raise a triable issue. - The
test is what is contained in the affidavits and other proof submitted.
Frequently, affidavits are submitted in opposition, reading: "As I stated
in my answer," etc. and, repeating the allegations set forth in the answer.
In an early case, O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank, the Court of
Appeals said:
"Defendant's affidavits used in opposition to the motion merely repeat the
various denials contained in the answer. These denials were insufficient to
raise an issue on a motion for summary judgment, since, under the rule, facts
must be presented rather than mere general or specific denials in order to
defeat a motion."73
In McAnsk v. Blauner it was said:
"In a separate defense the defendant sets up that the making of the contract
and the giving of the note were induced by a false representation that the
plaintiff and Ralph C. Caples had and could deliver a valid and marketable
title to the real estate in question. In his affidavits, however, the defendant
gives no evidence whatever to sustain this allegation. He does not state who
made the representations, to whom they were made, or any of the circumstances
in connection with them.... Rule 113 casts on the defendant the burden of
showing by affidavit or other proof 'such facts as may be deemed... sufficient
to entitle him to defend'. Its purpose was to stamp out the practice of pro-
curing a delay of judgment by the interposition of defenses good on their face,
which could not be substantiated even by affidavit."74
Where a similar question arose in England under Order XIV, Lord
Blackburn said:
"I think that when the affidavits are brought forward to raise that defence
they must, if I may use the expression condescend upon particulars. It is not
enough to swear, 'I say I owe the man nothing'. Doubtless, if it was true,
that you owed the man nothing, as you swear, that would be a good defense.
But that is not enough. You must satisfy the Judge that there is reasonable
ground for saying so. So again, if you swear that there was fraud, that will
not do. It is difficult to define it, but you must give such an extent of definite
72. See Dodwell & Co. Ltd. v. Silverman, 234 App. Div. 362, 363, 254 N. Y. Supp. 746,
747 (Ist Dep't 1932).
73. O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank, 239 N. Y. 386, 395, 146 N. E. 636, 638 (1925).
74. McAnsh v. Blaner, 222 App. Div. 381, 226 N. Y. Supp. 379 (1st Dep't 1928), aff'd,
248 N. Y. 537, 162 N. E. 515 (1928).
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facts pointing to the fraud as to satisfy the Judge that those are facts which
make it reasonable that you should be allowed to raise that defense and in like
manner as to illegality, and every other defense that might be mentioned."7
"To condescend upon particulars." That is something every attorney
should keep in mind when he prepares an answering affidavit.
The defendant, sued on promissory notes, said in her opposing af-
fidavit that she did not receive the moneys. That was held insufficient,
the court saying:
"The appellant gives no explanation of why she made and signed the notes
in suit. Her obligation on a motion of this character cannot rest upon the
answer, but is to show by affidavit such facts as would establish that there was
an issue to be tried. . . . Simply stating that she did not receive the moneys
does not make out a want of consideration, nor does it explain why the notes
were made."7 6
Where there has been a clear and unequivocal admission of liability,
it must be explained convincingly in order to defeat the motion. Par-
ticularly is this true when the admission is in writing.
"Plaintiff showed by the affidavit of David L. Galbraith, one of the parties to
the agreement, that on March 17, 1930, at a conference between the plaintiff
and defendant, when plaintiff requested defendant to pay the balance due and
owing, the defendant admitted the balance then due and agreed to make every
effort to discharge his obligation within sixty days.
"Defendant fails in his attempted explanation of the position taken by him
in this correspondence with the plaintiff. It is to the effect that he did not
wish to prejudice his business relations with the plaintiff and the other parties to
the agreement by disclaiming liability.
"We are clearly of the opinion that the defendant has failed to present facts
entitling him to defend and that the plaintiff should have judgment in full." 71
While Rule 113 does not specifically require the opposing party, as it
does in precise language require the moving party, to verify his cause of
action by evidentiary facts, that has been the practical construction
placed upon the rule. 8 In this connection, it should be noted that Rule
113 as originally adopted required the plaintiff to "verify" his cause of
action. The words "by evidentiary facts," later added, in no way
amplified the original requirement. Neither conclusions of law, nor
conclusions of fact, nor so-called ultimate facts, are sufficient to satisfy
75. See Wallingford v. Directors of the Mutual Society 5 A. C. 685, 704 (1880).
76. Hardy v. Ziegenbalg, 230 App. Div. 708, 708, 709, 242 N. Y. Supp. 898, 898 (2d
Dep't 1930).
77. Smith v. McCullaugb, 234 App. Div. 490, 494, 255 N. Y. Supp. 497, 500, 501 (1st
Dep't 1932).
78. See Cowan Oil & Refining Co. v. Miley Petroleum Corp. Ltd., 295 Pac. 504 (Cal.
App. 1931); O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank, 239 N. Y. 386, 146 N. E. 636 (1925);
Sher v. Rodkin, 198 N. Y. Supp. 597 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1923); Galusba Stove Co. v.
Pivnick Construction Co., 132 Misc. 875, 230 N. Y. Supp. 720 (Sup. Ct. 1928). Cf.
Webster & Co. v. Pelavin, 241 Mich. 19, 216 N. W. 430 (1927). See also 3 CA1RatoDY,
Nmv YoRx PaAcrIc. (2d Ed. 1931) 1078.
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the requirements of the rule. To say, "I shall be prepared at the trial tQ
show," etc. is bad. Likewise, "I shall have witnesses to prove" is in-
sufficient. Many attorneys have a fear of disclosing their evidence. Thus
it is frequently said "I do not at this time wish to disclose the evidence
that I have in support of my defense but at the trial I shall be able to
convince the court," etc. With that kind of opposing affidavit there
probably never will be a trial.
The defendant who opposes a motion of this kind, is called upon "to
assemble and reveal his proofs in order to show that the matters set up
in his answer were real and were capable of being established upon the
trial. Mere general averments will not suffice."O The opposing affidavit
must be by one having knowledge of the facts. A mere general state-
ment that the affiant has knowledge of the facts will not suffice. The
affidavit itself must show that the party making it has personal knowledge
of the facts to which he swears. If the party having knowledge of the
facts is not available, apply for an adjournment of the motion, setting
forth by affidavit the reasons for such application.
I recall one naive statement in a brief where the opposing affidavit was
made by an attorney on the basis of information obtained from his
client. He said "if an attorney is not a person having knowledge of the
facts under Rule 113, it is difficult to see who is." He misunderstood
completely the requirement of the rule. 0 That statement was exceeded
only by an observation made by another attorney in his brief to the
effect "that if the defendant did not have a genuine defense, why should
he have gone to the expense of retaining counsel?"
A defendant claims payment. The proper way to deal with this in an
opposing affidavit is not to say, "I shall prove that the plaintiff's claim
was paid in full" but to set forth where, to whom, by whom and in what
manner payment was made; if by check, attach the cancelled voucher
or account for its absence. The affidavit in opposition is not like a plead-
ing. In a pleading, evidentiary facts are frowned upon. In an opposing
affidavit conclusions are frowned upon and facts are desired. Jessel,
M. R., said on this point: ".... . If a man were allowed to say simply, 'you
have not given me credit for what you ought to have given me credit
for,' without giving a single item, a single date or a single fact, I think
defendants would be only too ready to believe there were some mistakes
in the account. It would be quite impossible to act upon such an un-
supported statement, or to look upon it as anything but a sham de-
fense." 8
79. Dodwell & Co. Ltd. v. Silverman, 234 App. Div. 362, 363, 254 N. Y. Supp. 746,
747 (1st Dep't 1932).
80. Cf. Seventh National Bank of New York v. Cromwell, 131 Alisc. 276, 226 N. Y.
Supp. 721 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
81. See Anglo-Italian Bank v. Wells, 3S L .T. R. 197, 200. See also Lion Brewer- of
New York v. Loughran, 223 App. Div. 623, 229 N. Y. Supp. 216 (1st Dep'% 1928).
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So, if it is claimed that the merchandise sued for was defective or not
in accordance with sample, general statements to that effect may not
suffice. It is better to state in what respects the merchandise delivered
or tendered was defective or did not conform to sample and what damage
was sustained. If an oral surrender and acceptance be claimed, a gen-
eral statement that the defendant surrendered the premises and the
landlord or his agent accepted the surrender is insufficient. That is all
right for the answer but not for the opposing affidavit. State when,
where and with whom the agreement for surrender was made. Give the
substance of the conversation if oral. State when the premises were
vacated, to whom the keys were turned over, etc. Likewise, if a con-
structive eviction is claimed, the facts, not conclusions, should be'set
forth in detail.
If there is a suit on a promissory note by one claiming to be a holder
in due course and for value, do not say in the affidavit, that as set forth
in the answer there is a good defense as against the original payee. Set
forth the facts showing such defense. State also any facts tending to
raise a question concerning the plaintiff's status as a holder in due course.
As will hereafter be shown, very little is required to defeat a motion for
summary judgment where it is claimed that the plaintiff is not a holder
in due course and for value, because, ordinarily, that is a matter which
can only be demonstrated on the witness stand and the defendant will
have a right to cross examine for this purpose. On the other hand, where
the party claiming to be a holder in due course makes out a clear case and
there is nothing in the opposing affidavit to cast any suspicion on the
bona fides of the transaction, the motion may be granted.
If sued on quantum meruit, the defense may be in substance, that while
there is something due to the plaintiff, he is not entitled to the amount
sued for because that is not the fair and reasonable value of the services
rendered or materials furnished. In that event, the motion for summary
judgment would be granted and an assessment of damages ordered. In
such a suit, however, the defense may be that there is nothing due to
the plaintiff, that he has been paid in full, for what the services rendered
or what the materials furnished were worth. If facts are set forth suf-
ficient to raise a triable issue as to whether the plaintiff has been paid
in full, the motion will be denied. A general statement to that effect may
not suffice. Set forth the facts showing the character of the services and
what they were worth, and if necessary submit a supporting affidavit by
one qualified to express an opinion concerning the value. 2
82. For cases dealing with summary judgment in situations where section 1083a and
section 1083b of the Civil Practice Act apply, see Union Trust Co. of Rochester v.
vetromile, 239 App. Div. 562, 268 N. Y. Supp. 26 (4th Dep't 1933). Aronson v. Kuttner,
241 App. Div. 760 (2d Dep't 1934); Palmer v. Hare, 241 App. Div. 694 (2d Dcp't 1934);
Meurer v. Keimel, 150 Misc. 113, 267 N. Y. Supp. 799 (Mun. Ct. 1933).
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Another question frequently arising on these motions is the applica-
tion of the parol evidence rule. It is important that copies of all the
pertinent writings be attached. The court may apply the parol evidence
rule on a motion for summary judgment as it does on a trial. 3 If, how-
ever, the question is a close one and depends upon fine distinctions with
respect to the facts, the court is inclined to deny the motion and allow
the case to proceed to trial. It is very important to determine whether
you are dealing with a condition precedent or a condition subsequent.
In the former case parol evidence may be received; in the latter case
it is generally rejected. The importance of setting forth fully and in
detail the facts upon which the parties rely to sustain their respective
contentions, can readily be appreciated.
The foregoing are a few examples of some of the pitfalls to be avoided
in preparing answering affidavits in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the answering
affidavit is not a pleading. Facts and not conclusions should be set forth
by one having personal knowledge. It is better to err on the side of
saying too much in an answering affidavit than of saying too little. It
must appear from the answering affidavit that there is a genuine, not a
sham, issue, a substantial, not a phantom, issue, to be tried.
Moving Party May Not Take Advantage of Defects
In the Pleading of an Adversary
As has already been stated, the pleading of a moving party is open to
attack on a motion for summary judgment. He cannot prevail unless
he has a good pleading, supported by an affidavit setting forth evi-
dentiary facts to sustain the allegations of the pleading. The granting
of the motion, is in effect an adjudication that the pleading of the moving
party is sufficient in law. From the very nature of the remedy of sum-
mary judgment, it is apparent that the same rule has no application to
the pleading of the opposing party. Even if the answer is defective, if
the affidavit in opposition sets forth facts showing an arguable defense,
the motion fails.
This was recognized by the Court of Appeals in the leading case of
Curry v. Mackenzie:
"The defendant's affidavit discloses a defense also of part payment, in that
he paid for the later services after he was no longer general manager. His
answer in that regard is, it is true, defective, for payment should have been
stated as a defense, partial, if not complete, and is not to be proved under a
denial. The facts, however, have now been shown, and the answer, though
imperfect, may be amended at the trial or sooner. Technical defects in the
83. Lion Brewery of New York v. Loughran, 223 App. Div. 623, 229 N. Y. Supp. 216
(lst Dep't 1928).
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pleading of an adversary are not available to a plaintiff upon an application
under this rule for the entry of summary judgment. The application is defeated
if the defendant 'shall show such facts as may be deemed, by the judge hearing
the motion, sufficient to entitle him to defend' (Rule 113). The remedy is to
be administered in furtherance of justice. '8 4
The court said that "technical defects in the pleading of an adversary
are not available to a plaintiff upon an application under this rule for the
entry of summary judgment." It would perhaps be more accurate to
say that no defect in the pleading of an adversary is available to a moving
party on an application for summary judgment.
Thus in Perlman v. Perlman, the court below, granted the plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment with leave to defendant to serve an
amended answer within five days, and further provided that upon failure
so to amend the plaintiff might enter judgment. The Appellate Division
held that such ruling was based upon a misconstruction of the very
nature of the remedy invoked. If the facts set forth in the opposing
affidavit showed an arguable defense, the defect in the answer should
have been disregarded and the motion should have been denied. If on
the other hand, regardless of the answer, the opposing affidavit did not
show the existence of a substantial defense, there was no reason to grant
leave to amend. The higher court said:
"The sufficiency of pleadings attacked by a motion for summary judgment
under Rules 113 and 114 of the Rules of Civil Practice is not determinative.
The basic principle of such a motion is whether the party whose pleading is
attacked has shown by affidavit or otherwise a triable issue or a right to defend.
Even though the pleading itself be deemed insufficient, the motion must be
denied if the affidavits show facts sufficient to constitute a defense entitling the
pleader to defend. Conversely, if sufficient facts are not shown, no leave to
plead anew should be granted. 8 5
This rule would apply where the defendant sued for goods sold and de-
livered, and improperly set up breach of warranty as a defense, rather
than as a counterclaim.
Some question has arisen whether the rule is applicable to a situation
where a defendant has failed to set up a counterclaim, not arising out of
the transaction in suit, but nevertheless one which under the Civil
Practice Act he had a right to interpose. It would seem that even in
such a case, if the opposing affidavit sets up facts showing the existence
of a counterclaim of this kind, summary judgment may not be granted.
This should be the rule, if we follow to its logical conclusion the prin-
ciple that on a motion for summary judgment the affidavits and not the
pleadings of the opposing party, are determinative.
84. 239 N. Y. 267, 272, 146 N. E. 375, 376 (1925). Weinberg v. Goldstein, 226 App,
Div. 479, 480, 235 N. Y. Supp. 529 (4th Dep't 1929).
85. Perlman v. Perlman, 235 App. Div. 313, 314, 257 N. Y. Supp. 48, 50 (1st Dcpt
1932). See also Gellens v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 241 App. Div. 591, 592, 593, 272
N. Y. Supp. 900, 902, 903 (1st Dep't 1934).
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It will be noticed moreover, that in the case of Curry v. Mackenzie,
the court held that the defective answer "may be amended at the trial
or sooner." The court did not order the amendment or grant the motion
unless an amended pleading was served within a certain time.8 G However
where an opposing party discovers a defect in his own pleading, it would
be advisable for him to serve with his answering affidavits a cross motion
for leave to amend.
The rules above set forth would seem to be applicable if a defendant is
the moving party. The motion should not be granted and the com-
plaint dismissed, where the facts in the opposing affidavit show a genuine
triable issue, although they are at variance with the complaint. Here
also, the pleading should not be determinative.",,
Facts Exclusively Within the Knowledge of the Moving Party
Since the rule was aimed at defenses that are feigned and not genuine,
it follows that under certain circumstances a defense of lack of knowledge
of the plaintiff's claim, is ground for a denial of the motion. Such a lack
of knowledge, however, must be shown to be real, rather than sham.
If the facts on which the application for summary judgment is based,
are exclusively within the knowledge of the moving party, the relief
asked for will be denied. If this were not so, summary judgment would
be a perversion of justice, instead of in furtherance thereof.
The answering affidavit should disclose this situation dearly. It
should set forth enough to show that, in truth, the opposing party has no
knowledge of the essential facts and that the situation is such that he
could not reasonably be expected to have such knowledge. It should
set forth, for example, what efforts were made to ascertain the facts and
with what result. If the facts are available to the opposing party by
investigation or inquiry on his part, his plea of lack of knowledge would
be without force. So, of course, if the facts are matters of public record.
"Under Rule 113 a defendant may properly in certain cases be com-
pelled to state his version of the matter in litigation, but where he shows
that he has no knowledge or information in regard to any material
allegation made by the plaintiff, he cannot be compelled to accept the
plaintiff's version and the court under such circumstances cannot strike
out the answer."8 7
Thus in a case where an administratrx was sued on a subscription
alleged to have been made by her intestate, summary judgment was
denied, it not having been shown that the defendant had knowledge of
86. See Weinberg v. Goldstein, 226 App. Div. 479, 235 N. Y. Supp. 529 (4th Dep't 1929).
86a. Marrin v. Smith, N. Y. L. J. Mar. 13, 1935, p. 1291, "A defendant cannot get
summary judgment, even though the complaint is bad, if the true facts warrant a denial.
87. Rogan v. Consolidated Coppermines Co., 117 Misc. 718, 727, 193 N. Y. Supp. 163,
168 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
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the truth of the plaintiff's allegations.8" "The test applied was whether
defendant had the knowledge which she denied she possessed, and plain-
tiff, having failed to show that she had, was refused summary judg-
ment."8 19
On the other hand, in one of the earliest cases arising under the new
rule, a defendant denied knowledge or information as to the ownership
of notes in suit. On the return day of the motion for summary judg-
ment, the notes were presented in court. It was held that the defendant
immediately became possessed of the knowledge and information denied
by it in its answer. "Upon production of the notes in court the instru-
ments became under direction of the justice subject, if inspection of them
was requested, to examination by counsel for defendant. Notice that
the notes would be produced in court was given to defendant in the
motion papers. Defendant omitted to file any affidavit or proof in
support of its denial of information or knowledge as to the ownership
of the notes or disclosing that it had a meritorious defense to the action."90
So it was held that a denial of knowledge or information sufficient to
fornm a belief as to the plaintiff's infancy was ineffectual, in the absence
of a showing contrary to the proof advanced by plaintiff by affidavit,
coupled with his birth certificate, a matter of record. 1
In situations of this character a good deal depends on the strength of
the affidavit of the moving party. In one case involving this problem,
the court said:
"The defendant's denial is at least as strong and as plausible as the plain-
tiff's affirmation. Where a plaintiff's allegations are unsatisfactory and are
made as to matters concerning which the defendant could not be expected to
have knowledge, the defendant should not be penalized for denying them in the
only manner possible to him. It may be that upon a trial the plaintiff would
not be able to convince the jury that it did agree with the owner to extend his
liability beyond the legal liability of a bailee who receives goods for the purpose
of doing work upon them. It may be that the defendant would be able to
show, by cross-examination or otherwise, that there was no such agreement."" 2
This case, like so many others involving summary judgment, depends for
its value as an authority, on the particular facts and circumstances in-
volved. Facts would have to be set forth in opposing affidavits, tending
to contradict or to cast doubt or suspicion upon the case set up in the
moving affidavits. "A statement of one's belief is not a statement 6f
88. Woodmere Academy v. Moskowitz, 212 App. Div. 457, 459, 208 N. Y. Supp. 578, 580
(2d Dep't 1925).
89. Edelman v. Public National Bank, 136 Misc. 213, 214, 239 N. Y. Supp. 335, 336
(N. Y. City Ct. 1930).
90. General Investment Co. v. Interborough R. T. Co., 235 N. Y. 133, 141, 139 N. E.
210, 219 (1923).
91. Bower v. Samuels, 226 App. Div. 769, 234 N. Y. Supp. 379, 380 (2d Dep't 1929).
92. Brooklyn Clothing Corp. v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 205 App. Div. 743, 748,
200 N. Y. Supp. 208, 212 (2d Dep't 1923).
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fact.... No testimony to this effect would be admissible upon a trial."4
To warrant summary judgment in an action upon an insurance policy
for example, the facts must be unusually clear, and fully presented. If
there is doubt or suspicion as to matters which ordinarily could not be
expected to be within the knowledge of the insurer the motion will be
denied. This applies particularly where the defense is arson, or suicide
or where disability is in issue. It will not do, however, for a defendant
to contend that the facts are exclusively within the knowledge of the
moving party and at the same time say in the opposing affidavit that he
is in possession of facts showing plaintiff is not entitled to judgment but
does not desire to disclose those facts until the trial. In one case, sum-
mary judgment was allowed in an action on a policy of fire insurance, the
court saying:
"The defendant does not show any evidentiary facts that entitle it to a trial
in respect of the claimed origin of the fire. There is an issue of fact in respect
of the amount of damages. This issue of fact does not bar summary judgment
under the present provisions of Rule 113 .'7D3
In this case it should be noted that in the opposing affidavit after
making certain statements concerning the nature of the occupancy,
defendant said:
"From these facts defendant without at this time disclosing the details of the
evidence it expects to adduce upon the trial of the action, believes the fire to
be of incendiary origin and hopes to prove such fact at the trial* 3"1
Sometimes a situation arises where the person who has sole knowledge
of the facts has left the employ of the opposing party. Ordinarily, that
of itself would not be sufficient to defeat the motion. What investigation
has the opposing party made, are the whereabouts of the former employee
known, has he refused to make an affidavit, is there anything shown to
cast doubt on the facts alleged by the moving party, is there any evidence
of collusion or that the former employee is so prejudiced that a truthful
version cannot be expected from him? Here also, a good deal depends
on the nature of the controversy and on the strength and completeness
of the moving affidavits. The opposing party, who himself is ignorant
of the facts, may resort to Rule 120, to which reference has already been
made, and apply for leave to take the testimony of a former employee,
to be used in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, if the
employee has refused to make an affidavit.
A type of case which commonly raises this question, is an action by a
holder in due course. Assuming that the affidavits in opposition set
forth facts showing a genuine defense as between the original parties to
92a. Irving Trust Co. v. Orvis, 139 Misc. 670, 671, 248 N. Y. Supp. 773 (Sup. CL 1931).
93. C. J. G. Corp. v. Knickerbocker Ins. Co., 242 App. Div. 685, 685, 273 N. Y. Supp.
42, 43 (2d Dep't 1934).
93a. See Case on Appeal, C. 3. G. Corp. v. Knickerbocker Ins. Co., p. 53.
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the instrument, under what circumstances will summary judgment be
granted? In the leading case of Karpas v. Bandler, summary judgment
was denied in such a situation, the court saying:
"In the case at bar the plaintiff being an interested witness, a jury would not
be bound to accept his testimony that he did not have knowledge of a con-
ditional delivery of the note, if there was in fact such a conditional delivery.
The jury might consider the testimony of the plaintiff in the light of all the
transactions between the parties, including the close business relations between
the plaintiff and Goldberg, and might reject the plaintiff's testimony of lack of
knowledge even though such testimony were not directly contradicted. As was
said by Mr. Justice Greenbaum in Vogel v. Pyne, 197 App. Div. 633, 637:
"'Where the determination of an important issue depends upon an interested
witness whose testimony is suspicious or where the attendant circumstances are
inconsistent with the conduct of a bona fide holder of the notes for value, it is
for the jury to say, although there is no direct oral or written testimony con-
tradictory of that given by such witness, whether his testimony is to be credited
and whether he was a bona fide holder of the notes for value'."94
So, in Weiss v. Goldberger where the same result was reached the court
said:
"There is sufficient to require a submission of the issue of the plaintiff's in-
nocence and good faith to a jury. A $5,000 note was purchased for $3,000
under such circumstances as could not be said to be the ordinary business
transaction with commercial paper. The plaintiff, as before stated, apparently
a man of limited means and needing the money in his own business, starts to
make payment for the note in very small installments running over the course
of ten days until the very day when he learns that criminal proceedings are
pending in connection with the obtaining of the note; and on this day he claims
that he paid five-sixths of the purchase price, and then some time within the
next two weeks thereafter obtains the endorsement of his transferor. It cer-
tainly cannot be said that the foregoing facts, so far as concerns the plaintiff,
are free from suspicion or susceptible of but the one inference of plaintiff's
innocence and good faith; and hence the credibility of the plaintiff as an inter-
ested witness, even though uncontradicted, would present a question of fact
which should be submitted to the jury."95
In these cases, it should be noted, that sufficient facts were shown to
cast some suspicion or doubt upon the validity of the plaintiff's position.
In such event defendant is entitled to a trial, in which cross examination
may be resorted to. On the other hand, the facts may be so clear, and
the situation so free from doubt that summary judgment may properly be
granted.9 6
94. Karpas v. Bandler, 218 App. Div. 418, 421, 218 N. Y. Supp. 500, 503 (1st Dep't
1926).
95. Weiss v. Goldberger, 209 App. Div. 615, 618, 205 N. Y. Supp. 1, 3 (1st Dep't 1924).
96. Terner Bros. v. Glickstein & Terner, Inc., 239 App. Div. 804, 263 N. Y. Supp. 993
(4th Dep't 1933), aff'd 263 N. Y. 555, 189 N. E. 695 (1933), a suit by one found to be a
holder in due course, where, however, the court also found that the defense as between the
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Counterclaims
In Chelsea Exchange Bank v. AMunozY 7 the court held that the mere
interposition of a counterclaim would not in and of itself operate to
defeat a motion for summary judgment. The test was whether there
was an issue of fact to be tried under the answer, whether based upon
denial, defense or counterclaim. "Merely labeling allegations as con-
stituting a counterclaim does not present a triable issue."' s A counter-
claim will not defeat a motion for summary relief unless supported by
"facts tending to show that it is meritorious or that the defendant is
entitled to defend by virtue thereof."99
Troublesome questions arose as to the right of a plaintiff to have
summary judgment, where no triable issue was shown in opposition to the
cause of action alleged in the complaint, but where there was such an
issue shown in opposition to the counterclaim. Before the 1933 amend-
ment to Rule 113, let us assume that A sued B for $5,000 and B
counterclaimed for the same or a larger amount. If the pleadings ad-
mitted A's claim, or if despite a denial of the claim there was in fact
no triable issue raised in opposition to A's claim, but there was with
respect to B's counterclaim, the court would refuse to grant A's motion
for summary judgment and to stay execution thereunder pending the
trial of the counterclaim.100
If, before the amendment, A sued B for $10,000 and B counterclaimed
for $5,000, A's claim being admitted by the pleadings, but there being
a triable issue with respect to B's counterclaim, the plaintiff was entitled
to partial summary judgment for $5,000, that is, the difference between
the amount of A's claim and the amount of the counterclaim, without
any stay of execution, and the action would be severed as to the
balance.10 1 The same result would probably be reached if A's claim were
contested by the pleadings, but if from the papers it appeared that there
was no triable issue of fact concerning it, apart from the counterclaim.
original parties was a sham. On this point see also Dodwell & Co. Ltd. v. Silverman, 234
App. Div. 362, 254 N. Y. Supp. 246 (1st Dep't 1932); Harter v. Peoples Bank of Buffalo,
221 App. Div. 122, 223 N. Y. Supp. 115 (4th Dep't 1927); Bernstein v. Kritzer, 224 App.
Div. 387, 231 N. Y. Supp. 97 (1st Dep't 1928); Weinberg v. Goldstein, 226 App. Div.
479, 235 N. Y. Supp. 529 (4th Dep't 1929).
97. Chelsea Exchange Bank v. Munoz, 202 App. Div. 702, 193 N. Y. Supp. 335 (Ist
Dep't 1922). See also H-"inman v. :lnman, 146 "Misc. 786, 263 N. Y. Supp. 90 (Ut
Dep't 1931).
98. Gordon Corp. v. Cosman, 232 App. Div. 280, 285, 249 N. Y. Supp. S44, 548 (1st
Dep't 1931).
99. Smith v. Cranleigh, Inc., 224 App. Div. 376, 377, 231 N. Y. Supp. 201, 202 (let
Dep't 1928).
100. Dietz v. Glynne, 221 App. Div. 329, 223 N. Y. Supp. 221 (2d Dep't 1927); Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. National Dry Dock Repair Co. Inc., 230 App. Div. 486, 245 N. Y. Supp.
365 (1st Dep't 1930).
101. Dairymen's League Co-operative Ass'n Inc., v. Egli, 228 App. Div. 164, 239 N. Y.
Supp. 152 (4th Dep't 1930); Irving Trust Co. v. Leff, 253 N. Y. 359, 171 N. E. 569 (1930).
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In 1933, the following clause was added to Rule 113:
"This rule shall be applicable to counterclaims, so that either party may move
with respect to the same as though the counterclaim were an independent action.
The court in its discretion may provide for the withholding of entry of judg-
- ment until the disposition of the issue in the main case."
No cases in the appellate courts construing this clause have been
brought to my attention. Although its language is very broad, the pur-
pose of the added clause was to take care of a situation where a counter-
claim arose from transactions not connected with the subject-matter
involved in the cause of action set up in the complaint. That counter-
claim, irrespective of its amount as compared with plaintiff's claim,
would be treated as an independent action. The plaintiff could move
for summary judgment dismissing the counterclaim, and if shown to
be without sufficient merit to warrant a trial, his motion would be
granted, the counterclaim would be eliminated, and the plaintiff would
then go to trial on the issues raised by his complaint and the defenses
thereto., The court, in the order granting the motion, may direct
that the entry of judgment dismissing the counterclaim be withheld
pending the trial of the main issue.
So a defendant might move for summary judgment on his counter-
claim, treating it as an independent action, and if no triable issue were
raised in opposition thereto, his motion would be granted. The counter-
claim would be removed from the case and the court in its order would
make appropriate provision that the entry of judgment on the counter-
claim, in whole or in part, be withheld until the determination of the
main issue.
Although the question is by no means free from doubt, a literal con-
struction of the amendment would not seem to give a plaintiff any
different rights than he had prior thereto, where no triable issue was
raised in opposition to the cause of action alleged in the complaint, but
where the defendant was entitled to go to trial on his counterclaim.
Motion for Reargument and to Vacate Summary Judgment
On Newly Discovered Evidence
With respect to reargument, the same rules apply to motions for sum-
mary judgment, as to motions generally. On reargument, the court con-
siders only the original papers submitted. If the court has overlooked
or misinterpreted any decision, or has erred in the construction placed
upon the contents of the papers originally submitted, it may change or
correct its decision. The usual practice is to apply to the judge who
decided the motion, for leave to reargue.
"An order on a motion for reargument is not, ordinarily, appealable, at least
where the motion was determined upon its merits, since the court which hears
the original motion is the only one which can judge whether it has failed to
consider any of the points raised upon the motion, and its determination upon
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such a point must be final. But where such a motion is denied because of the
erroneous belief that the court had no power to hear it, an appeal does lie.
"It is important, in this connection, to distinguish between motions for re-
argument and motions for leave to renew a motion upon new or additional
papers, since a wholly different rule applies as to appeals from orders upon
motions of the latter class.
"An order denying an application for leave to renew a motion upon new or
additional papers is appealable. Such an application is distinguished from
a motion for reargument, which, ...is not appealable, by the fact that the
latter is confined to the original motion papers. If the application is in fact
for leave to renew, appeal will lie from the order thereon, even though it is
misnamed in the papers as a motion for reargument."'0 2
A moving party may renew his motion for summary judgment, after
it has once been denied:
1st. Where leave so to do was granted in the order denying the prior
motion.
2nd. Where the prior denial, without leave to renew, was predicated on
a defect in the moving party's pleading and it has since been amended,
although here, likewise, it would be better practice to apply to the court
for leave to renew the motion.
Except as before indicated, a moving party ordinarily will not be
granted leave to renew his motion for summary judgment on new or
additional papers, unless he can bring himself substantially within the
rule relating to newly discovered evidence. "Rule 113, C. P. R., is not
intended to be used as perpetual annoyance. In the same manner that
a litigant is generally limited to one trial he is restricted to a single
application of the rule. ... It is expected that he will present all, not
some, of the facts supporting his contention when the application is sub-
mitted. He is not permitted to hold back anything, and if he discovers
aught of advantage after submission which he should have known before
that is his misfortune. The rule was conceived to end not to prolong
litigation. Having once applied for summary judgment he may not
without leave do so again." °3
The defendant or party against whom summary judgment has been
directed, may, in a proper case, move to vacate or to modify the judg-
ment. n one case, the application for a new hearing was granted after
affirmance on appeal, on condition that the defendant file a surety bond
against any judgment that might be found against him. The motion
was made on new facts claimed to be unknown at the time of the original
motion. The court did not consider the requirements with respect to
newly discovered evidence. It held that a court has inherent power to
102. See CAPMODY, NEW YORE PRATCE (2d ed. 1932) §§ 33, 34, and casea therein cited.
103. Edora Garment Co. Inc., v. Rothman, N. Y. L. J., July 6, 1934, at 45. See alho
"Denial of Mlotion for Summary Judgment as Res Judicata," N. Y. L. J., April 3, 1935,
at 1688.
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open its judgments in the furtherance of justice, and the "exceptional
circumstances in this case require exceptional treatment."104 The court
here went very far.
In a recent case, the motion was by the defendant to set aside a sum-
mary judgment as excessive, on the ground that after having acquiesced
in the amount he discovered that it was too high. The amount was
admitted in the pleadings and in the affidavit. The court said, that while
the defendant stood in the same position as one seeking relief on the
grounds of newly discovered evidence, it did not bring itself within the
rule authorizing new trials on such grounds. Nevertheless the motion
was granted to the extent of having the propriety of the disputed item
tried by a referee. "It would be an inexcusable maladministration of
justice to compel .a defendant to pay $5,625 more than it owes. Con-
science would not permit such a result. Regardless of procedural fetters
the more basic principles of justice will not deny relief to a litigant
against whom an unfounded judgment has been made. Law is not so
inflexible or inexorable. Substance will not tolerate being outwitted or
outdone by forms."1°5
On an application based on newly discovered evidence, it would not
be necessary to make and settle a case, as is required after a trial. The
application should be made at Special Term, and ordinarily will be
referred to the judge who made the original disposition.
Appeals
Originally it was held that by the denial of his motion "no substantial
right of the plaintiff has been violated," and that the appellate courts
would not review orders denying motions for summary judgment. The
error of these rulings soon became apparent, and the earlier cases on
this point were overruled. 106 By amendment of the Municipal Court
Code, in 1933, appeal may be taken as of right from an order of that
court denying one of these motions."0 7
104. Greenberg v. Rudnick, 143 Misc. 793, 258 N. Y. Supp. 679, 680 (N. Y. City Ct.
1932), citing Ladd v.* Stevenson, 112 N. Y. 325, 332, 19 N. E. 842, 844 (1889), which
referred to the inherent power of the court to relieve from judgments, taken through
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect," on application of anyone for sufficlent
reason in furtherance of justice.
105. Uptown Transportation Corp. v. Fisk Discount Corp., 151 Misc. 469, 471-472,
271 N. Y. Supp. 723, 726 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
106. Dwan v. Massarene, 199 App. Div. 872, 880, 192 N. Y. Supp. 577, 583 (1st Dep't
1922), explained in Poland Export Corp. v. Marcus, 204 App. Div. 302, 304, 198 N. Y.
Supp. 5, 7 (1st Dep't 1923.), overruled on this point by Lee v. Granbard, 205 App, Dlv.
344, 199 N. Y. Supp. 563 (1st Dep't 1923); Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. v.
Lazard-Godchaux Co. of America Inc., 207 App. Div. 174, 201 N. Y. Supp. 771 (1st Dep't
1923), aff'd 329 X. Y. 610, 147 N. E. 216 (1925). See Interstate Pulp Co. v. New York
Tribune, 207 App. Div. 453, 454, 202 N. Y. Supp. 232, 233 (1st Dep't 1923).
107. § 154, 6-a.
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The appeal should be from the order denying the motion for summary
judgment or from the order granting summary judgment and the judg-
ment entered thereon. The practice on this point was clarified by the
early case of Donnelly v. Bauder:
"The respondent urges that the judgment must be sustained because no re-
viewable question is before this court for the reason that the appeal is only
from the judgment and not from the order granting judgment. The remedy
furnished by summary judgment is comparatively new. The practice generally
adopted seems to be that on decision of the motion a formal order is entered
denying or granting the motion. If the motion is denied, an appeal is taken
from the order; if granted, a judgment is entered and the appeal is usually
taken from both the order and judgment. We think that if the motion is
granted, an order is not strictly necessary, although undoubtedly it is better
practice to enter an order striking out the answer and directing judgment....
Rule 113 says: 'The answer may be struck out and judgment entered thereon
on motion.' The motion seems to be for a judgment like that for a non-suit
on a trial and may be entered on the direction of the court, with or without
a formal order."' 0 s
Argument on Motion and Appeal
There is a difference of opinion among judges, on the value of oral
argument, on motions for summary judgment. Some have found argu-
ment of little benefit, because of the frequent variance between what
is said by counsel, and what is actually contained in the affidavits. The
writer believes that argument on these motions is desirable. It often
happens, that by inadvertence, something that would turn the scale has
been omitted, and when attention is called to it, is readily supplied; or
something has been stated as a conclusion, which may easily be restated
in proper form. When the papers have been submitted without argu-
ment, the tendency is to take them as they stand. There has already
been pointed out the futility of attempting to argue in support of the
motion, without having carefully examined the affidavits in opposition.
There can be no intelligent argument unless that is done. On appeal, I
do not see any value to oral argument on these motions, unless the facts
or law involved are unusually complicated.
On arguments of this character, it is well to bear in mind one of the
rules followed by Charles Russell, distinguished English barrister, later
Lord Chief Justice, never to trouble about authorities or case law sup-
posed to bear upon a particular point, until you have accurately and
definitely ascertained the precise facts. He said he got this advice from
Lord Westbury when he was arguing a case before him. "I was plung-
ing into a citation of cases, when he very good-naturedly pulled me up
and said 'Mr. Russell, don't trouble yourself with authorities until we
have ascertained with precision the facts, and then we shall probably
108. 217 App. Div. 59, 62, 216 N. Y. Supp. 437, 440 (4th Dep't 1926).
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find that a number of authorities which seem to bear some relation to the
question, have really nothing important to do with it' ".
Working of tke Rule
In an early case arising under Rule 113, the court said: "That this
rule has worked a substantial reform in practice and greatly relieved
an overburdened calendar has been demonstrated by experience." ' This
impression has since been fully confirmed. In 1931, a limited factual
study of Rule 113 was made by Felix S. Cohen."' Two hundred and
fifty motions for summary judgment, found on the calendar of the
Supreme Court, New York County, between October 1, 1929, and
January 28, 1930, formed the subject matter of the study. Of these
250 motions, the motion was withdrawn or marked off in 30 cases,
granted in 139 and denied in 81. In 5 cases, appeals were taken from
the order granting summary judgment. There were three affirmances
and two reversals. When these two cases came to trial, one resulted
in a verdict for the defendant and the other in a verdict for the
plaintiff for a slightly smaller amount than originally allowed. In 7
cases, appeals were taken from the order denying the motion. Of these,
5 were affirmed and 2 reversed. Of the 81 cases in which the motion
was denied, 30 were settled, 12 were abandoned, 15 were pending un-
determined when the study was completed, and 22 went to trial. Of
these 22, 19 resulted in judgment for the plaintiff (7 defaults) and 3 in
judgments for the defendant (in 2 of which the complaint was dis-
missed).
The study disclosed that the remedy was not being utilized promptly
by the bar. There was a failure to move for summary judgment until
long after issue was joined. In one case, there was a delay of five years.
The average delay was 114 days. In half the cases studied, there was an
intervening period of 56 days or more, between joinder of issue and the
making of the motion. The conclusion arrived at as the result of the
study, was that "the procedure for granting summary judgment upon
motion and affidavit, as it existed in New York until the recent extension
of Rule 113, has generally accomplished its avowed object of reducing
the delays of litigation, that it has not given rise to the abuses that were
once feared (i.e., the arbitrary exclusion of reasonable defenses, or the
improper use of the motion to anticipate the defendant's line of proof),
but that its potentialities have not been fully appreciated and utilized by
the bar. The motion for summary judgment has been invoked primarily
in cases where the validity of the plaintiff's action is clear and the
financial responsibility of the defendant doubtful.""'
109. See Hanna v. Mitchell, 202 App. Div. 504, 518, 196 N. Y. Supp. 43, 55, 56 (1st
Dep't 1922).
110. See Cohen, Sumr y Judgments in the Supreme Court of New York, (1932) 32
COL. LAw R'Lv. 825, 835-845.
111. Id. at 856.
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Since this study was made, the Commission on the Administration of
Justice, through its Executive Secretary, Leonard S. Saxe, made an
interesting and valuable survey of the subject, which in large measure
sustained the prior findings.' 2 This study is worthy of careful con-
sideration by the bar. A few of the findings and conclusions will be
summarized:
In the Supreme Court, New York County, from October 1, 1921 to
January 1, 1931, there were approximately 5,600 motions for summary
judgment. Over 700 were withdrawn or marked off, 2800 were granted,
and 2100 were denied.
In 1932 and 1933, of about 2075 motions for summary judgment,
heard in the Supreme Court, New York County, there were 171 appeals,
87 in cases where the motion was granted and 84 where it was denied.
There were 132 affirmances, of which 69 were in cases where the motion
had been granted and 63 where it had been denied. There were 38
reversals, of which 17 were in cases where the motion had been granted
and 21 where it had been denied.
The conclusions based on the statistical survey, were in part as
follows:
"As the summary judgment remedy has become better known, both its
utilization and efficiency have increased in the Supreme Court, New York
County. It now appears to be granted with finality in well over 50% of the
applications and to have eliminated about 1/9 or 11% of all Trial Term work
in New York County, ... Besides this great saving of judicial time, it has
markedly expedited the disposition of cases to the benefit of litigant
plaintiffs....
"The burden placed by summary judgment procedure upon the Appellate
Division, First Department, is quite small, . .. The proportion of affirmances
and reversals of summary judgment motions is not out of line when compared
with the proportion of affirmances and reversals to total cases, nor when the
affirmances and reversals of motions granted below are compared to the
affirmances and reversals of motions denied below. The Appellate Division
is slightly more inclined to reverse a summary judgment granted below than
one denied below, as is shown by its own figures of 28.43% of grantings re-
versed as compared to 23.49% of denials reversed, and yet the Court of Ap-
peals, on review, seems to have decided that the Appellate Division is not
quite strict enough in that regard.""'3
The number of such cases finding their way to the Court of Appeals
is so small, however, as hardly to afford any real basis for this con-
clusion.
The report pointed out, that a comparison of the figures showed that
summary judgment procedure in the Municipal Court, was dearly out of
line with the favorable results in the Supreme Court and City Courts.
112. See Legislative Document 1934 No. 50 G-A, Statistical Survey of Summary Judg-
ments in New York.
113. Id. at 21, 22.
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Under the old law, an appeal to the Appellate Term from an order of the
Municipal Court denying a motion for summary judgment could only
be had by permission. This, it was felt, had the tendency to encourage
denial of such motions. After the report was submitted to the Legisla-
ture, an amendment to the Municipal Court Code was passed, allowing
such appeal, as of right.
The Personality of the Judge
The bar and the general public as well, are to be congratulated on
what is apparently a recent discovery, that a judge is a human being,
that he has a combination of characteristics, which for want of a better
name are called his personality, and that this personality is sometimes
reflected in his judicial determinations. The subject is one of absorbing
interest and cannot be gone into in detail here. One thing is clear.
There is less room for the interposition of a judge's personality in decid-
ing motions for summary judgment, than there is when he passes on
questions of constitutional law involving issues for the most part social,
economic or political in character. The same applies to matrimonial
actions, to proceedings involving the custody of children, and to ques-
tions of negligence, particularly when it comes to the assessment of
damages.
In the factual study made in 1931, while, as was to be expected
there was a variance in the percentage of these motions granted by dif-
ferent judges, it was in no way substantial. On the contrary, it indicated
a close similarity of opinion among the different judges, on the tests to be
applied. It did appear, that those judges who passed on many motions
for summary judgment, granted a somewhat larger percentage than those
who passed on a few.
In the survey made by the Commission on the Administration of
Justice, it was stated that information as to the percentage of those
motions granted or denied by individual judges, was not readily available.
Detailed information was given with respect to the record of each judge
on appeals from his determination of motions for summary judgment.
The results are significant. So far as the Supreme Court, New York
County, is concerned, the difference in percentage of reversals was
negligible. There was probably less difference than in appeals after
trial. In the Municipal Court, with two or three exceptions, the situa-
tion was the same.
All of these facts are of real value, and it is to be hoped that the newly
created Judicial Council, with the active support and cooperation of the
bar, will develop and perfect a system of judicial statistics and informa-
tion that will enable us to discover the weak points in methods of ad-
ministration and how to correct them. Too much cannot be expected at
the outset, but the Council, in its first report, has made a good beginning,
and has justified the confidence of those who recommended its creation.
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Partial Summary Judgment
Under Section 476 of the Civil Practice Act, judgment may be
rendered by the court in favor of any party and "at any stage of an
action or appeal, if warranted by the pleadings or the admissions of a
party or parties, and a judgment may be rendered by the court as to a
part of a cause of action and the action proceed as to the remaining
issues, as justice may require." Under Rule 114, if it appears that the
defense interposed applies only to part of plaintiff's claim or that any
part is admitted, the plaintiff may have final judgment forthwith for so
much of his claim as the defense does not cover. The action is then
severed as to the balance. Rule 114 is limited by the provisions of Rule
113, and under the former a motion can be granted only in cases in
which summary judgment may be entered under the latter.,
A motion for partial summary judgment will not be granted unless
the admission contained in the pleading or answering affidavit is explicit,
positive and definite as to the conceded indebtedness, or unless the court
finds that there is no defense to a portion of plaintiff's claim. Where
plaintiff sued to recover for services rendered, in the reasonable value
of $1300, and defendant admitted the services but denied that they were
worth $1300 and alleged that they were "not worth more than $400,"
partial summary judgment was denied.11 Where plaintiff sued for
goods sold and delivered and defendant alleged that the goods instead of
being of the value of $20,505 were worth "about $10,000," partial sum-
mary judgment likewise was refused. In neither was there an outright
admission that any definite sum was due."" Of course, if these cases had
arisen after the 1932 amendment to Rule 113, summary judgment would
have been granted and an assessment of damages ordered because
liability was admitted and only the amount of damage was in issue.
Where plaintiff sought to recover in quantum meruit, for work done
and materials furnished to the reasonable value of $1340.05, and the
answer denied the allegations of the complaint, and set up that the work
was done pursuant to an express agreement whereby defendant promised
to pay plaintiff $500 for the entire job, partial summary judgment was
denied. The court said:
"The answer of the defendant is not an admission of part of the cause of
action pleaded... If the defense be proved, plaintiff's cause of action, as he
chose to plead it, would be completely disposed of." 17
114. Sydeman v. Waumbeck, 212 App. Div. 422, 203 N. Y. Supp. 716 (1st Dep't 1925);
Applebaum v. Gross, 117 Misc. 140, 191 N. Y. Supp. 710 (Sup. Ct. 1921), afl'd, 200 App.
Div. 914, 192 N. Y. Supp. 912 (2d Dep't 1922).
115. Doctors' Service v. Russell, 121 Misc. 600, 201 N. Y. Supp. 764 (Sup. CL 1923).
116. Sydeman v. Waumnbeck, 212 App. Div. 422, 208 N. Y. Supp. 716 (1st Dep't 1925);
Lyons v. Shubert, 119 Misc. 694, 197 N. Y. Supp. 253 (App. Term, Ist Dep't 1922).
117. Lyons v. Shubert, 119 ,fisc. 694, 695, 197 N. Y. Supp. 253, 254 (App. Term, Ist
Dep'lt 1922).
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If a tender is not accepted, it may not be made the basis of partial
summary judgment.118 Under Rule 114, the court is empowered to grant
partial summary judgment on such terms as may be just.1
Conclusion
The important rule we have been considering, is a "two-edged weapon,
useful if it precludes the interposition of defenses solely for delay, but
dangerous if it deprives a defendant of the opportunity to have a trial
of seriously contested questions of fact."
The bar may be assured that no motion at Special Term, or on appeal,
is given more thorough, painstaking study and consideration than the
motion for summary judgment. It is a great responsibility to say that
"in truth there is nothing to be tried." It is, however, the duty of the
court so to hold when it is clear, that what has been set up as a cause of
action or as a defense, presents no genuine or substantial triable issue,
is sham and feigned, and asserted solely to harass and annoy or for the
purposes of delay.
Whatever statistical information we now have, shows that this sum-
mary remedy has resulted in no abuse, that it is being administered care-
fully, yet courageously, and that it is working out exceedingly well. It is
to be hoped that the recently created Judicial Council will make a yearly
report on the workings of the rule, and the results accomplished by it.
The remedy of summary relief is by no means a panacea for the ills
from which we are suffering, in our present methods of administering the
law. It will not do away with perjury. It was not expected to. That
evil has persisted in the face of Divine, as well as human, prohibition.
A perjurer can defeat many motions for summary judgment. Never-
theless the rule is effective. Its tendency is to minimize perjury. It
serves to discourage the bringing of suits that have no basis and the
interposition of sham answers. It fosters early settlements. For every
case in which perjury is committed on the stand, there are scores of false
denials in answers. Under the Rule, no longer can a litigant shelter
himself, and ease his conscience behind technical denials, which he
deludes himself into believing are nothing more than legal red tape. He
is brought out into the open. If he swears falsely, it is not to any legal
jargon, but to the facts.
Would that we could say, when we decide one olf these motions,
"Of that there is no manner of doubt,
No probable, possible shadow of doubt,
No possible doubt whatever."
118. Valentine v. Perlman, 216 App. Div. 548, 215 N. Y. Supp. 338 (1st Dep't 1926).
119. Applebaum v. Gross, 117 Misc. 140, 191 N: Y., Supp. 710 (Sup. Ct. 1921), afJ'd,
200 App. Div. 914, 192 N. Y. Supp. 712 (2d Dep't 1922).
[Vol. 4
1935] SUMMARY JUDGMENT 227
But, alas! Such omniscience is denied to mortals, except on the stage
of light opera. The record shows, however, that the remedy is being
administered "in furtherance of justice."
Much can be accomplished, not alone so far as these motions are
concerned, but for the improvement of the administration of justice
generally, if there is a closer relationship between the bench and the bar,
and a better understanding of their respective problems. Then, indeed,
shall we, working together as brethren in a great and honorable calling,
give a true account of our stewardship for the benefit of mankind. Then
will there be carried into the deep heart of man the realization that
the law is not a game, but a vigilant, searching and restless process,
designed to bring about what is just and honorable and useful. Then
will right be exalted, and the precepts of justice come to their hour of
triumph.
